linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set

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Message-ID: <13679.1491830392@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date:   Mon, 10 Apr 2017 14:19:52 +0100
From:   David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc:     dhowells@...hat.com, Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
        linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk,
        Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@...e.com>, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
        kexec@...ts.infradead.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        keyrings@...r.kernel.org, matthew.garrett@...ula.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set

Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:

> From an IMA perspective, either a file hash or signature are valid,
> but for this usage it must be a signature.

Not necessarily.  If IMA can guarantee that a module is the same based on its
hash rather than on a key, I would've thought that should be fine.

David