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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jK1j3UWUakakFw=EfVwg+Rnovzst52+uZJYesLqLY+n5A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2017 09:19:07 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm: Add additional consistency check
On Tue, Apr 11, 2017 at 9:16 AM, Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com> wrote:
> On Tue, 11 Apr 2017, Michal Hocko wrote:
>
>> static inline void *index_to_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, struct page *page,
>> @@ -3813,14 +3818,18 @@ void kfree(const void *objp)
>> {
>> struct kmem_cache *c;
>> unsigned long flags;
>> + struct page *page;
>>
>> trace_kfree(_RET_IP_, objp);
>>
>> if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)))
>> return;
>> + page = virt_to_head_page(obj);
>> + if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(!PageSlab(page)))
>
> There is a flag SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS that is available for this check.
> Consistency checks are configuraable in the slab allocator.
>
> Mentioned that before and got this lecture about data consistency checks.
It seems that enabling the debug checks comes with a non-trivial
performance impact. I'd like to see consistency checks by default so
we can handle intentional heap corruption attacks better. This check
isn't expensive...
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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