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Message-ID: <CAPkE-bUsY8qD5xHU4VD-dxtAGxCGUhuQQmcS4kN0FyAozPRzhw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2017 15:30:02 +0200
From: Sebastien Buisson <sbuisson.ddn@...il.com>
To: Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>, sds@...ho.nsa.gov
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
william.c.roberts@...el.com, serge@...lyn.com,
james.l.morris@...cle.com, Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Sebastien Buisson <sbuisson@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function
2017-04-12 13:55 GMT+02:00 Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>:
> As currently written this code isn't something we would want to merge
> upstream for two important reasons:
>
> * No abstraction layer at the LSM interface. The core kernel code
> should not call directly into any specific LSM, all interaction should
> go through the LSM hooks.
The idea behind this patch and the other one was to replicate what is
done with selinux_is_enabled(). As I understand it now,
selinux_is_enabled() should remain the only exception to the LSM
hooks.
So do you agree if I propose a new security_is_enforced() function at
the LSM abstraction layer, which will be hooked to a
selinux_is_enforced() function defined inside the SELinux LSM?
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