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Message-ID: <1492005519.3881.8.camel@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2017 09:58:39 -0400
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To: Sebastien Buisson <sbuisson.ddn@...il.com>,
Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
william.c.roberts@...el.com, serge@...lyn.com,
james.l.morris@...cle.com, Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Sebastien Buisson <sbuisson@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function
On Wed, 2017-04-12 at 15:30 +0200, Sebastien Buisson wrote:
> 2017-04-12 13:55 GMT+02:00 Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>:
> > As currently written this code isn't something we would want to
> > merge
> > upstream for two important reasons:
> >
> > * No abstraction layer at the LSM interface. The core kernel code
> > should not call directly into any specific LSM, all interaction
> > should
> > go through the LSM hooks.
>
> The idea behind this patch and the other one was to replicate what is
> done with selinux_is_enabled(). As I understand it now,
> selinux_is_enabled() should remain the only exception to the LSM
> hooks.
> So do you agree if I propose a new security_is_enforced() function at
> the LSM abstraction layer, which will be hooked to a
> selinux_is_enforced() function defined inside the SELinux LSM?
Even your usage of selinux_is_enabled() looks suspect; that should
probably go away. Only other user of it seems to be some cred validity
checking that could be dropped as well. The include/linux/selinux.h
interfaces were originally for use by audit and secmark when there were
no other LSMs and have gradually been removed.
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