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Message-ID: <CAPkE-bUCK2kFpi6Ls2VYPRDH624xgiu3GGnw5LyeFAfswiaeSA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 12 Apr 2017 17:19:14 +0200
From:   Sebastien Buisson <sbuisson.ddn@...il.com>
To:     Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Cc:     Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
        william.c.roberts@...el.com, serge@...lyn.com,
        james.l.morris@...cle.com, Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Sebastien Buisson <sbuisson@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function
2017-04-12 15:58 GMT+02:00 Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>:
> Even your usage of selinux_is_enabled() looks suspect; that should
> probably go away.  Only other user of it seems to be some cred validity
> checking that could be dropped as well.
Well the main reason for calling selinux_is_enabled() is performance
optimization.
Should I propose a patch to add a new security_is_enabled() function
at the LSM abstraction layer? Or do you consider we should not test
security enabled at all?
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