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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+mP784rGqx1CWOOXM=AhAN7EegRZxO_=OG0y6k0hQs+g@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2017 08:49:10 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/4] added SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT
kernel config
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 6:40 AM, Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk> wrote:
>> Since tty sessions are usually separated by different users, how would
>> they have the same one and yet need something like this?
>>
>> Also, why not put this in the tty config section?
>
> The normal attack use case people argue about is a rogue process on the
> users machine sitting there waiting until the user has logged in to a
> remote machine and is idle and then doing stuff.
It's still a threat, though, and adding this with default n to allow
the more paranoid builders a chance to mitigate it seems reasonable to
me.
> Attackers of course don't bother doing that because it's easier to get
> the user to run a different ssh client instead.
Attackers will always take the easiest route, so we have to keep
killing the low hanging fruit.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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