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Message-Id: <20170421083037.12746-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2017 01:30:32 -0700
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>
To: keyrings@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH 0/5] KEYS: sanitize key payloads
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
This patch series introduces more thorough sanitization of keys managed
by the kernel key retention service. This helps keep sensitive key
material from sticking around in the slab caches after keys are released.
This series covers the syscall interface and several of the common key
types. It doesn't cover some of the less commonly used key types. Also,
these changes are of course limited to the keyrings mechanism itself and
don't remove the responsibility for keyrings users to securely handle any
other sensitive data they may copy or generate. Regardless, there's no
reason not to make the keyrings API follow best practices.
Eric Biggers (5):
KEYS: sanitize add_key() and keyctl() key payloads
KEYS: user_defined: sanitize key payloads
KEYS: encrypted: sanitize all key material
KEYS: trusted: sanitize all key material
KEYS: sanitize key structs before freeing
include/linux/key.h | 1 -
security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 31 +++++++++-----------
security/keys/gc.c | 4 +--
security/keys/keyctl.c | 4 ++-
security/keys/trusted.c | 50 ++++++++++++++------------------
security/keys/user_defined.c | 16 +++++++---
6 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
--
2.12.2
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