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Message-ID: <871ssls9zi.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2017 16:53:53 -0500
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@...hat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
"Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com> writes:
> Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@...ssion.com):
>>
>> Serge,
>>
>> Is there any change of a Signed-off-by on this patch? Otherwise I don't
>> think we can merge it.
>
> For pete's sake! I'm sorry, i seem to remember with just about every
> other project other than this. particular. patch.
>
> Does this
>
> Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
>
> suffice, or should I resend?
Good enough for me. I figured it was an oversight but I had to check.
Eric
>> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com> writes:
>>
>> > Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
>> > security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any
>> > unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private
>> > namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
>> > host.
>> >
>> > However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
>> > desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with
>> > limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and
>> > dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect
>> > whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set
>> > setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop
>> > partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root.
>> >
>> > This patch introduces v3 of the security.capability xattr. It builds a
>> > vfs_ns_cap_data struct by appending a uid_t rootid to struct
>> > vfs_cap_data. This is the absolute uid_t (that is, the uid_t in user
>> > namespace which mounted the filesystem, usually init_user_ns) of the
>> > root id in whose namespaces the file capabilities may take effect.
>> >
>> > When a task asks to write a v2 security.capability xattr, if it is
>> > privileged with respect to the userns which mounted the filesystem, then
>> > nothing should change. Otherwise, the kernel will transparently rewrite
>> > the xattr as a v3 with the appropriate rootid. Subsequently, any task
>> > executing the file which has the noted kuid as its root uid, or which is
>> > in a descendent user_ns of such a user_ns, will run the file with
>> > capabilities.
>> >
>> > Similarly when asking to read file capabilities, a v3 capability will
>> > be presented as v2 if it applies to the caller's namespace.
>> >
>> > If a task writes a v3 security.capability, then it can provide a uid for
>> > the xattr so long as the uid is valid in its own user namespace, and it
>> > is privileged with CAP_SETFCAP over its namespace. The kernel will
>> > translate that rootid to an absolute uid, and write that to disk. After
>> > this, a task in the writer's namespace will not be able to use those
>> > capabilities (unless rootid was 0), but a task in a namespace where the
>> > given uid is root will.
>> >
>> > Only a single security.capability xattr may exist at a time for a given
>> > file. A task may overwrite an existing xattr so long as it is
>> > privileged over the inode. Note this is a departure from previous
>> > semantics, which required privilege to remove a security.capability
>> > xattr. This check can be re-added if deemed useful.
>> >
>> > This allows a simple setcap/setxattr to work, should allow tar to work,
>> > and should allow us to support tar in one namespace and untar in another
>> > while preserving the capability, without risking leaking privilege into
>> > a parent namespace.
>> >
>> > A patch to linux-test-project adding a new set of tests for this
>> > functionality is in the nsfscaps branch at github.com/hallyn/ltp
>> >
>> > Changelog:
>> > Nov 02 2016: fix invalid check at refuse_fcap_overwrite()
>> > Nov 07 2016: convert rootid from and to fs user_ns
>> > (From ebiederm: mar 28 2017)
>> > commoncap.c: fix typos - s/v4/v3
>> > get_vfs_caps_from_disk: clarify the fs_ns root access check
>> > nsfscaps: change the code split for cap_inode_setxattr()
>> > Apr 09 2017:
>> > don't return v3 cap for caps owned by current root.
>> > return a v2 cap for a true v2 cap in non-init ns
>> > Apr 18 2017:
>> > . Change the flow of fscap writing to support s_user_ns writing.
>> > . Remove refuse_fcap_overwrite(). The value of the previous
>> > xattr doesn't matter.
>> > ---
>> > fs/xattr.c | 30 ++++-
>> > include/linux/capability.h | 5 +-
>> > include/linux/security.h | 2 +
>> > include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 22 +++-
>> > security/commoncap.c | 237 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>> > 5 files changed, 268 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
>> >
>> > diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
>> > index 7e3317c..75cc65a 100644
>> > --- a/fs/xattr.c
>> > +++ b/fs/xattr.c
>> > @@ -170,12 +170,29 @@ int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
>> > const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
>> > {
>> > struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
>> > - int error = -EAGAIN;
>> > + int error;
>> > + void *wvalue = NULL;
>> > + size_t wsize = 0;
>> > int issec = !strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
>> > XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN);
>> >
>> > - if (issec)
>> > + if (issec) {
>> > inode->i_flags &= ~S_NOSEC;
>> > +
>> > + if (!strcmp(name, "security.capability")) {
>> > + error = cap_setxattr_convert_nscap(dentry, value, size,
>> > + &wvalue, &wsize);
>> > + if (error < 0)
>> > + return error;
>> > + if (wvalue) {
>> > + value = wvalue;
>> > + size = wsize;
>> > + }
>> > + }
>> > + }
>> > +
>> > + error = -EAGAIN;
>> > +
>> > if (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) {
>> > error = __vfs_setxattr(dentry, inode, name, value, size, flags);
>> > if (!error) {
>> > @@ -184,8 +201,10 @@ int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
>> > size, flags);
>> > }
>> > } else {
>> > - if (unlikely(is_bad_inode(inode)))
>> > - return -EIO;
>> > + if (unlikely(is_bad_inode(inode))) {
>> > + error = -EIO;
>> > + goto out;
>> > + }
>> > }
>> > if (error == -EAGAIN) {
>> > error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> > @@ -200,10 +219,11 @@ int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
>> > }
>> > }
>> >
>> > +out:
>> > + kfree(wvalue);
>> > return error;
>> > }
>> >
>> > -
>> > int
>> > vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
>> > size_t size, int flags)
>> > diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
>> > index 6ffb67e..b973433 100644
>> > --- a/include/linux/capability.h
>> > +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
>> > @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
>> > #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
>> >
>> > #include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
>> > -
>> > +#include <linux/uidgid.h>
>> >
>> > #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
>> > #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
>> > @@ -248,4 +248,7 @@ extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
>> > /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
>> > extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
>> >
>> > +extern int cap_setxattr_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, const void *value,
>> > + size_t size, void **wvalue, size_t *wsize);
>> > +
>> > #endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
>> > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
>> > index 96899fa..bd49cc1 100644
>> > --- a/include/linux/security.h
>> > +++ b/include/linux/security.h
>> > @@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
>> > extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
>> > extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
>> > extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
>> > +extern int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>> > + void **buffer, bool alloc);
>> > extern int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
>> > extern int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
>> > unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
>> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
>> > index 49bc062..fd4f87d 100644
>> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
>> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
>> > @@ -60,9 +60,13 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
>> > #define VFS_CAP_U32_2 2
>> > #define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_2))
>> >
>> > -#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2
>> > -#define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_2
>> > -#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_2
>> > +#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_3 0x03000000
>> > +#define VFS_CAP_U32_3 2
>> > +#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3 (sizeof(__le32)*(2 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_3))
>> > +
>> > +#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3
>> > +#define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_3
>> > +#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_3
>> >
>> > struct vfs_cap_data {
>> > __le32 magic_etc; /* Little endian */
>> > @@ -72,6 +76,18 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {
>> > } data[VFS_CAP_U32];
>> > };
>> >
>> > +/*
>> > + * same as vfs_cap_data but with a rootid at the end
>> > + */
>> > +struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
>> > + __le32 magic_etc;
>> > + struct {
>> > + __le32 permitted; /* Little endian */
>> > + __le32 inheritable; /* Little endian */
>> > + } data[VFS_CAP_U32];
>> > + __le32 rootid;
>> > +};
>> > +
>> > #ifndef __KERNEL__
>> >
>> > /*
>> > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
>> > index 78b3783..8abb9bf 100644
>> > --- a/security/commoncap.c
>> > +++ b/security/commoncap.c
>> > @@ -332,6 +332,179 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
>> > return error;
>> > }
>> >
>> > +static bool rootid_owns_currentns(kuid_t kroot)
>> > +{
>> > + struct user_namespace *ns;
>> > +
>> > + if (!uid_valid(kroot))
>> > + return false;
>> > +
>> > + for (ns = current_user_ns(); ; ns = ns->parent) {
>> > + if (from_kuid(ns, kroot) == 0)
>> > + return true;
>> > + if (ns == &init_user_ns)
>> > + break;
>> > + }
>> > +
>> > + return false;
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > +/*
>> > + * getsecurity: We are called for security.* before any attempt to read the
>> > + * xattr from the inode itself.
>> > + *
>> > + * This gives us a chance to read the on-disk value and convert it. If we
>> > + * return -EOPNOTSUPP, then vfs_getxattr() will call the i_op handler.
>> > + *
>> > + * Note we are not called by vfs_getxattr_alloc(), but that is only called
>> > + * by the integrity subsystem, which really wants the unconverted values -
>> > + * so that's good.
>> > + */
>> > +int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
>> > + bool alloc)
>> > +{
>> > + int size, ret;
>> > + kuid_t kroot;
>> > + uid_t root, mappedroot;
>> > + char *tmpbuf = NULL;
>> > + struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
>> > + struct dentry *dentry;
>> > + struct user_namespace *fs_ns;
>> > +
>> > + if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0)
>> > + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> > +
>> > + dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
>> > + if (!dentry)
>> > + return -EINVAL;
>> > +
>> > + size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
>> > + ret = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, "security.capability",
>> > + &tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS);
>> > +
>> > + if (ret < 0)
>> > + return ret;
>> > +
>> > + fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
>> > + if (ret == sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data)) {
>> > + /* If this is sizeof(vfs_cap_data) then we're ok with the
>> > + * on-disk value, so return that. */
>> > + if (alloc)
>> > + *buffer = tmpbuf;
>> > + else
>> > + kfree(tmpbuf);
>> > + return ret;
>> > + } else if (ret != sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data)) {
>> > + kfree(tmpbuf);
>> > + return -EINVAL;
>> > + }
>> > +
>> > + nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
>> > + root = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
>> > + kroot = make_kuid(fs_ns, root);
>> > +
>> > + /* If the root kuid maps to a valid uid in current ns, then return
>> > + * this as a nscap. */
>> > + mappedroot = from_kuid(current_user_ns(), kroot);
>> > + if (mappedroot != (uid_t)-1 && mappedroot != (uid_t)0) {
>> > + if (alloc) {
>> > + *buffer = tmpbuf;
>> > + nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(mappedroot);
>> > + } else
>> > + kfree(tmpbuf);
>> > + return size;
>> > + }
>> > +
>> > + if (!rootid_owns_currentns(kroot)) {
>> > + kfree(tmpbuf);
>> > + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> > + }
>> > +
>> > + /* This comes from a parent namespace. Return as a v2 capability */
>> > + size = sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data);
>> > + if (alloc) {
>> > + *buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
>> > + if (*buffer) {
>> > + struct vfs_cap_data *cap = *buffer;
>> > + __le32 nsmagic, magic;
>> > + magic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_2;
>> > + nsmagic = le32_to_cpu(nscap->magic_etc);
>> > + if (nsmagic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
>> > + magic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
>> > + memcpy(&cap->data, &nscap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
>> > + cap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(magic);
>> > + }
>> > + }
>> > + kfree(tmpbuf);
>> > + return size;
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > +static kuid_t rootid_from_xattr(const void *value, size_t size,
>> > + struct user_namespace *task_ns)
>> > +{
>> > + const struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap = value;
>> > + uid_t rootid = 0;
>> > +
>> > + if (size == XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
>> > + rootid = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
>> > +
>> > + return make_kuid(task_ns, rootid);
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > +/*
>> > + * User requested a write of security.capability.
>> > + *
>> > + * If all is ok, we return 0. If the capability needs to be converted,
>> > + * wvalue will be allocated (and needs to be freed) with the new value.
>> > + * On error, return < 0.
>> > + */
>> > +int cap_setxattr_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, const void *value, size_t size,
>> > + void **wvalue, size_t *wsize)
>> > +{
>> > + struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
>> > + uid_t nsrootid;
>> > + const struct vfs_cap_data *cap = value;
>> > + __u32 magic, nsmagic;
>> > + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
>> > + struct user_namespace *task_ns = current_user_ns(),
>> > + *fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
>> > + kuid_t rootid;
>> > +
>> > + if (!value)
>> > + return -EINVAL;
>> > + if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 && size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
>> > + return -EINVAL;
>> > + if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
>> > + return -EPERM;
>> > + if (size == XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
>> > + if (ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SETFCAP))
>> > + // user is privileged, just write the v2
>> > + return 0;
>> > +
>> > + rootid = rootid_from_xattr(value, size, task_ns);
>> > + if (!uid_valid(rootid))
>> > + return -EINVAL;
>> > +
>> > + nsrootid = from_kuid(fs_ns, rootid);
>> > + if (nsrootid == -1)
>> > + return -EINVAL;
>> > +
>> > + *wsize = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
>> > + nscap = kmalloc(*wsize, GFP_ATOMIC);
>> > + if (!nscap)
>> > + return -ENOMEM;
>> > + nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(nsrootid);
>> > + nsmagic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
>> > + magic = le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc);
>> > + if (magic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
>> > + nsmagic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
>> > + nscap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(nsmagic);
>> > + memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
>> > +
>> > + *wvalue = nscap;
>> > + return 0;
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > /*
>> > * Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached
>> > * to a file.
>> > @@ -385,7 +558,10 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
>> > __u32 magic_etc;
>> > unsigned tocopy, i;
>> > int size;
>> > - struct vfs_cap_data caps;
>> > + struct vfs_ns_cap_data data, *nscaps = &data;
>> > + struct vfs_cap_data *caps = (struct vfs_cap_data *) &data;
>> > + kuid_t rootkuid;
>> > + struct user_namespace *fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
>> >
>> > memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
>> >
>> > @@ -393,18 +569,20 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
>> > return -ENODATA;
>> >
>> > size = __vfs_getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, inode,
>> > - XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &caps, XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
>> > + XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &data, XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
>> > if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP)
>> > /* no data, that's ok */
>> > return -ENODATA;
>> > +
>> > if (size < 0)
>> > return size;
>> >
>> > if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
>> > return -EINVAL;
>> >
>> > - cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps.magic_etc);
>> > + cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc);
>> >
>> > + rootkuid = make_kuid(fs_ns, 0);
>> > switch (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) {
>> > case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
>> > if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1)
>> > @@ -416,15 +594,27 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
>> > return -EINVAL;
>> > tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2;
>> > break;
>> > + case VFS_CAP_REVISION_3:
>> > + if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
>> > + return -EINVAL;
>> > + tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_3;
>> > + rootkuid = make_kuid(fs_ns, le32_to_cpu(nscaps->rootid));
>> > + break;
>> > +
>> > default:
>> > return -EINVAL;
>> > }
>> > + /* Limit the caps to the mounter of the filesystem
>> > + * or the more limited uid specified in the xattr.
>> > + */
>> > + if (!rootid_owns_currentns(rootkuid))
>> > + return -ENODATA;
>> >
>> > CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
>> > if (i >= tocopy)
>> > break;
>> > - cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].permitted);
>> > - cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable);
>> > + cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].permitted);
>> > + cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].inheritable);
>> > }
>> >
>> > cpu_caps->permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
>> > @@ -462,8 +652,8 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
>> > rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
>> > if (rc < 0) {
>> > if (rc == -EINVAL)
>> > - printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_vfs_caps_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
>> > - __func__, rc, bprm->filename);
>> > + printk(KERN_NOTICE "Invalid argument reading file caps for %s\n",
>> > + bprm->filename);
>> > else if (rc == -ENODATA)
>> > rc = 0;
>> > goto out;
>> > @@ -660,15 +850,16 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>> > int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
>> > const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
>> > {
>> > - if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
>> > - if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
>> > - return -EPERM;
>> > + /* Ignore non-security xattrs */
>> > + if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
>> > + sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) != 0)
>> > + return 0;
>> > +
>> > + // For XATTR_NAME_CAPS the check will be done in __vfs_setxattr_noperm()
>> > + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0)
>> > return 0;
>> > - }
>> >
>> > - if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
>> > - sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
>> > - !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> > + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> > return -EPERM;
>> > return 0;
>> > }
>> > @@ -686,15 +877,22 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
>> > */
>> > int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
>> > {
>> > - if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
>> > - if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
>> > + /* Ignore non-security xattrs */
>> > + if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
>> > + sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) != 0)
>> > + return 0;
>> > +
>> > + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0) {
>> > + /* security.capability gets namespaced */
>> > + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
>> > + if (!inode)
>> > + return -EINVAL;
>> > + if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
>> > return -EPERM;
>> > return 0;
>> > }
>> >
>> > - if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
>> > - sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
>> > - !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> > + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> > return -EPERM;
>> > return 0;
>> > }
>> > @@ -1082,6 +1280,7 @@ struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] = {
>> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, cap_bprm_secureexec),
>> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv),
>> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv),
>> > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, cap_inode_getsecurity),
>> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
>> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, cap_mmap_file),
>> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, cap_task_fix_setuid),
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