linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] fs: Preventing READ_IMPLIES

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Message-ID: <20170424161441.GI25449@e104818-lin.cambridge.arm.com>
Date:   Mon, 24 Apr 2017 17:14:42 +0100
From:   Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
To:     Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
Cc:     Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@...aro.org>,
        "dongbo (E)" <dongbo4@...wei.com>,
        Peter Maydell <Peter.Maydell@....com>,
        Linuxarm <linuxarm@...wei.com>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        arm-mail-list <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs: Preventing READ_IMPLIES_EXEC Propagation

On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 04:58:41PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 04:40:23PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 11:33:14AM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > > On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 09:01:52PM +0100, Peter Maydell wrote:
> > > > On 18 April 2017 at 18:01, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com> wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 08:33:52PM +0800, dongbo (E) wrote:
> > > > >> From: Dong Bo <dongbo4@...wei.com>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> In load_elf_binary(), once the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC flag is set,
> > > > >> the flag is propagated to its child processes, even the elf
> > > > >> files are marked as not requiring executable stack. It may
> > > > >> cause superfluous operations on some arch, e.g.
> > > > >> __sync_icache_dcache on aarch64 due to a PROT_READ mmap is
> > > > >> also marked as PROT_EXEC.
> > > > 
> > > > > That's affecting most architectures with a risk of ABI breakage. We
> > > > > could do it on arm64 only, though I'm not yet clear on the ABI
> > > > > implications (at a first look, there shouldn't be any).
> > > > 
> > > > Is there a reason why it isn't just straightforwardly a bug
> > > > (which we could fix) to make READ_IMPLIES_EXEC propagate to
> > > > child processes?
> > > 
> > > While I agree that it looks like a bug, if there are user programs
> > > relying on such bug we call it "ABI". On arm64, I don't think there is
> > > anything relying on inheriting READ_IMPLIES_EXEC but I wouldn't change
> > > the compat task handling without the corresponding change in arch/arm.
> > > 
> > > > AFAICT this should be per-process: just because
> > > > init happens not to have been (re)compiled to permit non-executable
> > > > stacks doesn't mean every process on the system needs to have
> > > > an executable stack.
> > > 
> > > I think this also affects the heap if brk(2) is used (via
> > > VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS though I guess malloc mostly uses mmap these
> > > days).
> > 
> > I think it also affects mprotect, which is more worrying imo, particularly
> > for things like JIT code that is ported from 32-bit (although a quick look
> > at v8, ionmonkey and art suggests they all pass PROT_EXEC when needed).
> 
> As Peter said, the default behaviour is READ_IMPLIES_EXEC off,

For the record, just to clarify the "default" behaviour: what I meant is
that the (newish) toolchain always generates the GNU_STACK header which
disables the executable stack (and therefore READ_IMPLIES_EXEC is off).

-- 
Catalin