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Message-Id: <1493749661-22686-1-git-send-email-geert@linux-m68k.org>
Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 20:27:41 +0200
From: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Jiri Kosina <trivial@...nel.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>
Subject: [PATCH trivial] security: Grammar s/allocates/allocated/
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>
---
security/Kconfig | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 213df4d4f2c1527a..1bb0c5bc9caadf8c 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY
copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
- separately allocates pages, are not on the process stack,
+ separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
--
2.7.4
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