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Date:   Fri, 12 May 2017 09:49:33 -0500
From:   ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To:     Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@...tuozzo.com>
Cc:     <mhocko@...e.com>, <avagin@...nvz.org>, <peterz@...radead.org>,
        <oleg@...hat.com>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        <rppt@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, <luto@...nel.org>,
        <gorcunov@...nvz.org>, <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        <mingo@...nel.org>, <serge@...lyn.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] pid_ns: Fix race between setns'ed fork() and zap_pid_ns_processes()

Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@...tuozzo.com> writes:

> On 12.05.2017 17:26, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@...tuozzo.com> writes:
>> 
>>> Imagine we have a pid namespace and a task from its parent's pid_ns,
>>> which made setns() to the pid namespace. The task is doing fork(),
>>> while the pid namespace's child reaper is dying. We have the race
>>> between them:
>>>
>>> Task from parent pid_ns             Child reaper
>>> copy_process()                      ..
>>>   alloc_pid()                       ..
>>>   ..                                zap_pid_ns_processes()
>>>   ..                                  disable_pid_allocation()
>>>   ..                                  read_lock(&tasklist_lock)
>>>   ..                                  iterate over pids in pid_ns
>>>   ..                                    kill tasks linked to pids
>>>   ..                                  read_unlock(&tasklist_lock)
>>>   write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);   ..
>>>   attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID);       ..
>>>   ..                                ..
>>>
>>> So, just created task p won't receive SIGKILL signal,
>>> and the pid namespace will be in contradictory state.
>>> Only manual kill will help there, but does the userspace
>>> care about this? I suppose, the most users just inject
>>> a task into a pid namespace and wait a SIGCHLD from it.
>>>
>>> The patch fixes the problem. It moves disable_pid_allocation()
>>> into find_child_reaper() where tasklist_lock is held,
>>> and this allows to simply check for (pid_ns->nr_hashed & PIDNS_HASH_ADDING)
>>> in copy_process(). If allocation is disabled, we just
>>> return -ENOMEM like it's made for such cases in alloc_pid().
>> 
>> This problem sounds very theoretical has it ever come up in practice?
>> I am asking to see if this is something we will care enough about to
>> backport.
>
> I haven't seen this on practice. I think we may apply the policy, which
> used to coverity reports, though it's not a one.
>
>> Please look at what happens when you call
>> spin_unlock_irq(&pidmap_lock) under writelock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
>
> Ah, missed that, thanks.
>  
>> Please also look at what happens when pid == &init_pid but
>> p->nsproxy->pid_ns_for_children happens to be have PIDNS_HASH_ADDING
>> set.

Apologies I meant PIDNS_HASH_ADDING clear.

> init pid refers to init_pid_ns, which has PIDNS_HASH_ADDING set. So,
> there shouldn't be a problem.
>
> Could you explain, what do you mean?

I mean locally in copy_process your code is not correct.
Instead of caching pid_ns you want to use ns_of_pid(pid) so that
if pid == &init_pid you don't care what strange things are going on
in the calling process.

Eric

> Kirill
>  
>> All of that said I think this is a fix worth fixing.
>> 
>> Eric
>> 
>>> Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@...tuozzo.com>
>>> CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
>>> CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
>>> CC: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
>>> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
>>> CC: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
>>> CC: Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>
>>> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
>>> CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
>>> CC: Andrei Vagin <avagin@...nvz.org>
>>> CC: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>
>>> CC: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
>>> ---
>>>  kernel/exit.c          |    2 ++
>>>  kernel/fork.c          |   15 ++++++++++-----
>>>  kernel/pid_namespace.c |    3 ---
>>>  3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
>>> index 516acdb0e0ec..9310e69fbc5f 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/exit.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/exit.c
>>> @@ -586,6 +586,8 @@ static struct task_struct *find_child_reaper(struct task_struct *father)
>>>  		return reaper;
>>>  	}
>>>  
>>> +	/* Don't allow any more processes into the pid namespace */
>>> +	disable_pid_allocation(pid_ns);
>>>  	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
>>>  	if (unlikely(pid_ns == &init_pid_ns)) {
>>>  		panic("Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x%08x\n",
>>> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
>>> index bfd91b180778..dbafabf6c7b1 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/fork.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
>>> @@ -1523,6 +1523,7 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
>>>  					unsigned long tls,
>>>  					int node)
>>>  {
>>> +	struct pid_namespace *pid_ns;
>>>  	int retval;
>>>  	struct task_struct *p;
>>>  
>>> @@ -1735,8 +1736,9 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
>>>  	if (retval)
>>>  		goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
>>>  
>>> +	pid_ns = p->nsproxy->pid_ns_for_children;
>>>  	if (pid != &init_struct_pid) {
>>> -		pid = alloc_pid(p->nsproxy->pid_ns_for_children);
>>> +		pid = alloc_pid(pid_ns);
>>>  		if (IS_ERR(pid)) {
>>>  			retval = PTR_ERR(pid);
>>>  			goto bad_fork_cleanup_thread;
>>> @@ -1845,10 +1847,11 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
>>>  	*/
>>>  	recalc_sigpending();
>>>  	if (signal_pending(current)) {
>>> -		spin_unlock(&current->sighand->siglock);
>>> -		write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
>>>  		retval = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
>>> -		goto bad_fork_cancel_cgroup;
>>> +		goto bad_fork_unlock_siglock;
>>> +	} else if (unlikely(!(pid_ns->nr_hashed & PIDNS_HASH_ADDING))) {
>>> +		retval = -ENOMEM;
>>> +		goto bad_fork_unlock_siglock;
>>>  	}
>>>  
>>>  	if (likely(p->pid)) {
>>> @@ -1906,7 +1909,9 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
>>>  
>>>  	return p;
>>>  
>>> -bad_fork_cancel_cgroup:
>>> +bad_fork_unlock_siglock:
>>> +	spin_unlock(&current->sighand->siglock);
>>> +	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
>>>  	cgroup_cancel_fork(p);
>>>  bad_fork_free_pid:
>>>  	cgroup_threadgroup_change_end(current);
>>> diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
>>> index d1f3e9f558b8..aedf86a8017e 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
>>> @@ -210,9 +210,6 @@ void zap_pid_ns_processes(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns)
>>>  	struct task_struct *task, *me = current;
>>>  	int init_pids = thread_group_leader(me) ? 1 : 2;
>>>  
>>> -	/* Don't allow any more processes into the pid namespace */
>>> -	disable_pid_allocation(pid_ns);
>>> -
>>>  	/*
>>>  	 * Ignore SIGCHLD causing any terminated children to autoreap.
>>>  	 * This speeds up the namespace shutdown, plus see the comment

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