linux-kernel - [PATCH(RE-RESEND) v1 01/11] mm/kasan: rename _is_zero to _is

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Message-ID: <20170516012827.GB16015@js1304-desktop>
Date:   Tue, 16 May 2017 10:28:29 +0900
From:   Joonsoo Kim <js1304@...il.com>
To:     Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, kernel-team@....com
Subject: [PATCH(RE-RESEND) v1 01/11] mm/kasan: rename _is_zero to _is_nonzero

Sorry for a noise.
Failure is due to suspicious subject.
Change it and resend.

---------------------->8-------------------
>From 989d7b079c1fd0b934d98d738cbecf7a56f8c6e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>
Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2017 12:52:13 +0900
Subject: [PATCH v1 01/11] mm/kasan: rename _is_zero to _is_nonzero

They return positive value, that is, true, if non-zero value
is found. Rename them to reduce confusion.

Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>
---
 mm/kasan/kasan.c | 14 +++++++-------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
index c81549d..85ee45b0 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_16(unsigned long addr)
 	return false;
 }
 
-static __always_inline unsigned long bytes_is_zero(const u8 *start,
+static __always_inline unsigned long bytes_is_nonzero(const u8 *start,
 					size_t size)
 {
 	while (size) {
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long bytes_is_zero(const u8 *start,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static __always_inline unsigned long memory_is_zero(const void *start,
+static __always_inline unsigned long memory_is_nonzero(const void *start,
 						const void *end)
 {
 	unsigned int words;
@@ -245,11 +245,11 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long memory_is_zero(const void *start,
 	unsigned int prefix = (unsigned long)start % 8;
 
 	if (end - start <= 16)
-		return bytes_is_zero(start, end - start);
+		return bytes_is_nonzero(start, end - start);
 
 	if (prefix) {
 		prefix = 8 - prefix;
-		ret = bytes_is_zero(start, prefix);
+		ret = bytes_is_nonzero(start, prefix);
 		if (unlikely(ret))
 			return ret;
 		start += prefix;
@@ -258,12 +258,12 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long memory_is_zero(const void *start,
 	words = (end - start) / 8;
 	while (words) {
 		if (unlikely(*(u64 *)start))
-			return bytes_is_zero(start, 8);
+			return bytes_is_nonzero(start, 8);
 		start += 8;
 		words--;
 	}
 
-	return bytes_is_zero(start, (end - start) % 8);
+	return bytes_is_nonzero(start, (end - start) % 8);
 }
 
 static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_n(unsigned long addr,
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_n(unsigned long addr,
 {
 	unsigned long ret;
 
-	ret = memory_is_zero(kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr),
+	ret = memory_is_nonzero(kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr),
 			kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr + size - 1) + 1);
 
 	if (unlikely(ret)) {
-- 
2.7.4