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Message-ID: <20170517145645.GO18247@dhcp22.suse.cz>
Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 16:56:45 +0200
From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>
To: Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, cgroups@...r.kernel.org,
Li Zefan <lizefan@...wei.com>,
Mel Gorman <mgorman@...hsingularity.net>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Anshuman Khandual <khandual@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC 1/6] mm, page_alloc: fix more premature OOM due to race
with cpuset update
On Wed 17-05-17 09:48:25, Cristopher Lameter wrote:
> On Wed, 17 May 2017, Michal Hocko wrote:
>
> > > > So how are you going to distinguish VM_FAULT_OOM from an empty mempolicy
> > > > case in a raceless way?
> > >
> > > You dont have to do that if you do not create an empty mempolicy in the
> > > first place. The current kernel code avoids that by first allowing access
> > > to the new set of nodes and removing the old ones from the set when done.
> >
> > which is racy and as Vlastimil pointed out. If we simply fail such an
> > allocation the failure will go up the call chain until we hit the OOM
> > killer due to VM_FAULT_OOM. How would you want to handle that?
>
> The race is where? If you expand the node set during the move of the
> application then you are safe in terms of the legacy apps that did not
> include static bindings.
I am pretty sure it is describe in those changelogs and I won't repeat
it here.
> If you have screwy things like static mbinds in there then you are
> hopelessly lost anyways. You may have moved the process to another set
> of nodes but the static bindings may refer to a node no longer
> available. Thus the OOM is legitimate.
The point is that you do _not_ want such a process to trigger the OOM
because it can cause other processes being killed.
> At least a user space app could inspect
> the situation and come up with custom ways of dealing with the mess.
I do not really see how would this help to prevent a malicious user from
playing tricks.
--
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs
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