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Message-ID: <20170518075037.GA9084@quack2.suse.cz>
Date:   Thu, 18 May 2017 09:50:37 +0200
From:   Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>
To:     Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        "Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong@...cle.com>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
        Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@...rosoft.com>,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-nvdimm@...ts.01.org,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        Pawel Lebioda <pawel.lebioda@...el.com>,
        Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@...el.com>,
        Xiong Zhou <xzhou@...hat.com>, Eryu Guan <eguan@...hat.com>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] dax: Fix race between colliding PMD & PTE entries

On Wed 17-05-17 11:16:39, Ross Zwisler wrote:
> We currently have two related PMD vs PTE races in the DAX code.  These can
> both be easily triggered by having two threads reading and writing
> simultaneously to the same private mapping, with the key being that private
> mapping reads can be handled with PMDs but private mapping writes are
> always handled with PTEs so that we can COW.
> 
> Here is the first race:
> 
> CPU 0					CPU 1
> 
> (private mapping write)
> __handle_mm_fault()
>   create_huge_pmd() - FALLBACK
>   handle_pte_fault()
>     passes check for pmd_devmap()
> 
> 					(private mapping read)
> 					__handle_mm_fault()
> 					  create_huge_pmd()
> 					    dax_iomap_pmd_fault() inserts PMD
> 
>     dax_iomap_pte_fault() does a PTE fault, but we already have a DAX PMD
>     			  installed in our page tables at this spot.
>
> 
> Here's the second race:
> 
> CPU 0					CPU 1
> 
> (private mapping write)
> __handle_mm_fault()
>   create_huge_pmd() - FALLBACK
> 					(private mapping read)
> 					__handle_mm_fault()
> 					  passes check for pmd_none()
> 					  create_huge_pmd()
> 
>   handle_pte_fault()
>     dax_iomap_pte_fault() inserts PTE
> 					    dax_iomap_pmd_fault() inserts PMD,
> 					       but we already have a PTE at
> 					       this spot.

So I don't see how this second scenario can happen. dax_iomap_pmd_fault()
will call grab_mapping_entry(). That will either find PTE entry in the
radix tree -> EEXIST and we retry the fault. Or we will not find PTE entry
-> try to insert PMD entry which collides with the PTE entry -> EEXIST and
we retry the fault. Am I missing something?

The first scenario seems to be possible. dax_iomap_pmd_fault() will create
PMD entry in the radix tree. Then dax_iomap_pte_fault() will come, do
grab_mapping_entry(), there it sees entry is PMD but we are doing PTE fault
so I'd think that pmd_downgrade = true... But actually the condition there
doesn't trigger in this case. And that's a catch that although we asked
grab_mapping_entry() for PTE, we've got PMD back and that screws us later.

Actually I'm not convinced your patch quite fixes this because
dax_load_hole() or dax_insert_mapping_entry() will modify the passed entry
with the assumption that it's PTE entry and so they will likely corrupt the
entry in the radix tree.

So I think to fix the first case we should rather modify
grab_mapping_entry() to properly go through the pmd_downgrade path once we
find PMD entry and we do PTE fault.

What do you think?

								Honza


> 
> The core of the issue is that while there is isolation between faults to
> the same range in the DAX fault handlers via our DAX entry locking, there
> is no isolation between faults in the code in mm/memory.c.  This means for
> instance that this code in __handle_mm_fault() can run:
> 
> 	if (pmd_none(*vmf.pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma)) {
> 		ret = create_huge_pmd(&vmf);
> 
> But by the time we actually get to run the fault handler called by
> create_huge_pmd(), the PMD is no longer pmd_none() because a racing PTE
> fault has installed a normal PMD here as a parent.  This is the cause of
> the 2nd race.  The first race is similar - there is the following check in
> handle_pte_fault():
> 
> 	} else {
> 		/* See comment in pte_alloc_one_map() */
> 		if (pmd_devmap(*vmf->pmd) || pmd_trans_unstable(vmf->pmd))
> 			return 0;
> 
> So if a pmd_devmap() PMD (a DAX PMD) has been installed at vmf->pmd, we
> will bail and retry the fault.  This is correct, but there is nothing
> preventing the PMD from being installed after this check but before we
> actually get to the DAX PTE fault handlers.
> 
> In my testing these races result in the following types of errors:
> 
>  BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:ffff8800a817d280 idx:1 val:1
>  BUG: non-zero nr_ptes on freeing mm: 15
> 
> Fix this issue by having the DAX fault handlers verify that it is safe to
> continue their fault after they have taken an entry lock to block other
> racing faults.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@...ux.intel.com>
> Reported-by: Pawel Lebioda <pawel.lebioda@...el.com>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> 
> ---
> 
> I've written a new xfstest for this race, which I will send in response to
> this patch series.  This series has also survived an xfstest run without
> any new issues.
> 
> ---
>  fs/dax.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/dax.c b/fs/dax.c
> index c22eaf1..3cc02d1 100644
> --- a/fs/dax.c
> +++ b/fs/dax.c
> @@ -1155,6 +1155,15 @@ static int dax_iomap_pte_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf,
>  	}
>  
>  	/*
> +	 * It is possible, particularly with mixed reads & writes to private
> +	 * mappings, that we have raced with a PMD fault that overlaps with
> +	 * the PTE we need to set up.  Now that we have a locked mapping entry
> +	 * we can safely unmap the huge PMD so that we can install our PTE in
> +	 * our page tables.
> +	 */
> +	split_huge_pmd(vmf->vma, vmf->pmd, vmf->address);
> +
> +	/*
>  	 * Note that we don't bother to use iomap_apply here: DAX required
>  	 * the file system block size to be equal the page size, which means
>  	 * that we never have to deal with more than a single extent here.
> @@ -1398,6 +1407,15 @@ static int dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf,
>  		goto fallback;
>  
>  	/*
> +	 * It is possible, particularly with mixed reads & writes to private
> +	 * mappings, that we have raced with a PTE fault that overlaps with
> +	 * the PMD we need to set up.  If so we just fall back to a PTE fault
> +	 * ourselves.
> +	 */
> +	if (!pmd_none(*vmf->pmd))
> +		goto unlock_entry;
> +
> +	/*
>  	 * Note that we don't use iomap_apply here.  We aren't doing I/O, only
>  	 * setting up a mapping, so really we're using iomap_begin() as a way
>  	 * to look up our filesystem block.
> -- 
> 2.9.4
> 
-- 
Jan Kara <jack@...e.com>
SUSE Labs, CR

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