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Message-Id: <20170519212636.30440-2-riel@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 17:26:32 -0400
From: riel@...hat.com
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: danielmicay@...il.com, tytso@....edu, keescook@...omium.org,
hpa@...or.com, luto@...capital.net, mingo@...nel.org,
x86@...nel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
catalin.marinas@....com, linux-sh@...r.kernel.org,
ysato@...rs.sourceforge.jp
Subject: [PATCH 1/5] random,stackprotect: introduce get_random_canary function
From: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>
Introduce the get_random_canary function, which provides a random
unsigned long canary value with the first byte zeroed out on 64
bit architectures, in order to mitigate non-terminated C string
overflows.
Inspired by the "ascii armor" code in the old execshield patches,
and the current PaX/grsecurity code base.
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>
---
include/linux/random.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index ed5c3838780d..765a992c6774 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -57,6 +57,26 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void)
#endif
}
+/*
+ * On 64 bit architectures, protect against non-terminated C string overflows
+ * by zeroing out the first byte of the canary; this leaves 56 bits of entropy.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#define CANARY_MASK 0xffffffffffffff00UL
+#else /* big endian 64 bits */
+#define CANARY_MASK 0x00ffffffffffffffUL
+#endif
+#else /* 32 bits */
+#define CANARY_MASK 0xffffffffUL
+#endif
+static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void)
+{
+ unsigned long val = get_random_long();
+
+ return val & CANARY_MASK;
+}
+
unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
u32 prandom_u32(void);
--
2.9.3
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