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Message-ID: <20170519143344.GA15983@mail.hallyn.com>
Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 09:33:44 -0500
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
To: Peter Dolding <oiaohm@...il.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v6 0/2] security: tty: make
TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 12:48:17PM +1000, Peter Dolding wrote:
> Using cap_sys_admin as fix is like removing car windsheld because
> vision is being blocked by a rock hitting it.
Nonsense. If the application has cap_sys_admin then it is less contained and
more trusted anyway. If I went to the trouble to run an application in a
private user namespace (where it can have cap_sys_admin, but not targeted
at my tty) then it should be more contained. That's the point of targeted
capabilities.
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