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Message-Id: <20170523200904.779036636@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Tue, 23 May 2017 22:10:09 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Julius Werner <jwerner@...omium.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 103/103] drivers: char: mem: Check for address space wraparound with mmap()

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Julius Werner <jwerner@...omium.org>

commit b299cde245b0b76c977f4291162cf668e087b408 upstream.

/dev/mem currently allows mmap() mappings that wrap around the end of
the physical address space, which should probably be illegal. It
circumvents the existing STRICT_DEVMEM permission check because the loop
immediately terminates (as the start address is already higher than the
end address). On the x86_64 architecture it will then cause a panic
(from the BUG(start >= end) in arch/x86/mm/pat.c:reserve_memtype()).

This patch adds an explicit check to make sure offset + size will not
wrap around in the physical address type.

Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@...omium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/mem.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -343,6 +343,11 @@ static const struct vm_operations_struct
 static int mmap_mem(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	size_t size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
+	phys_addr_t offset = (phys_addr_t)vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	/* It's illegal to wrap around the end of the physical address space. */
+	if (offset + (phys_addr_t)size < offset)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!valid_mmap_phys_addr_range(vma->vm_pgoff, size))
 		return -EINVAL;


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