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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKQGiAcLe-6yWuqgZMQSFkO=zUR40G0=Th=qWxV+4Y+wA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 24 May 2017 09:16:01 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>
To:     Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
        "Ted Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" 
        <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        linux-sh <linux-sh@...r.kernel.org>,
        Yoshinori Sato <ysato@...rs.sourceforge.jp>,
        "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" 
        <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/5] fork,random: use get_random_canary to set tsk->stack_canary

On Wed, May 24, 2017 at 8:57 AM,  <riel@...hat.com> wrote:
> From: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>
>
> Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows
> from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they
> somehow obtain the canary value.
>
> Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree.
>
> Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>

Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  kernel/fork.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index aa1076c5e4a9..b3591e9250a8 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -560,7 +560,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node)
>         set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk);
>
>  #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
> -       tsk->stack_canary = get_random_long();
> +       tsk->stack_canary = get_random_canary();
>  #endif
>
>         /*
> --
> 2.9.3
>



-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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