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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKQGiAcLe-6yWuqgZMQSFkO=zUR40G0=Th=qWxV+4Y+wA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 09:16:01 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>
To: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
"Ted Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
linux-sh <linux-sh@...r.kernel.org>,
Yoshinori Sato <ysato@...rs.sourceforge.jp>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/5] fork,random: use get_random_canary to set tsk->stack_canary
On Wed, May 24, 2017 at 8:57 AM, <riel@...hat.com> wrote:
> From: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>
>
> Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows
> from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they
> somehow obtain the canary value.
>
> Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree.
>
> Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> kernel/fork.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index aa1076c5e4a9..b3591e9250a8 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -560,7 +560,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node)
> set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk);
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
> - tsk->stack_canary = get_random_long();
> + tsk->stack_canary = get_random_canary();
> #endif
>
> /*
> --
> 2.9.3
>
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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