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Message-ID: <20170527084135.GA26844@infradead.org>
Date: Sat, 27 May 2017 01:41:35 -0700
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 05/20] randstruct: Whitelist struct
security_hook_heads cast
On Fri, May 26, 2017 at 01:17:09PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> The LSM initialization routines walk security_hook_heads as an array
> of struct list_head instead of via names to avoid a ton of needless
> source. Whitelist this to avoid the false positive warning from the
> plugin:
I think this crap just needs to be fixed properly. If not it almost
defeats the protections as the "security" ops are just about everywhere.
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