linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 11/20] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs

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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKrha8-dU8vjr1U-hadZdaKrztXuo5iJLDXeBWHZS1ajw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Sat, 27 May 2017 13:03:23 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
Cc:     "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" 
        <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Bob Moore <robert.moore@...el.com>,
        Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@...el.com>,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 11/20] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs

On Sat, May 27, 2017 at 1:42 AM, Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org> wrote:
> On Fri, May 26, 2017 at 01:17:15PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Since the ACPICA source is maintained externally to the kernel, we can
>> neither switch it to designated initializers nor mark it
>> __no_randomize_layout. Until ACPICA-upstream changes[1] land to handle the
>> designated initialization, explicitly skip it in the plugin.
>>
>> [1] https://github.com/acpica/acpica/pull/248
>
> I'd just overried the ACPIA bullshit process and just include these
> changes, as they are a major improvement independent of any
> reandomization.

Well... I'd rather not. It's been explicitly NAKed by them already,
which is why I sent the upstream solution (though it's being ignored
currently).

I don't want this to block randstruct any longer, so that's why I took
a whitelisting approach here.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security