Message-ID: <e1c9e4e8-5427-b4b6-aad2-72c88552a6af@nmatt.com>
Date:   Mon, 29 May 2017 23:18:59 -0400
From:   Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>
To:     Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>,
        Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc:     Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
        linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI
 ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN

On 5/29/17 10:46 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 5/29/2017 7:00 PM, Matt Brown wrote:
>> Casey Schaufler,
>>
>> First I must start this off by saying I really appreciate your presentation on
>> LSMs that is up on youtube. I've got a LSM in the works and your talk has
>> helped me a bunch.
> 
> Thank you. Feedback (especially positive) is always appreciated.
> 
>>
>> On 5/29/17 8:27 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> On 5/29/2017 4:51 PM, Boris Lukashev wrote:
>>>> With all due respect sir, i believe your review falls short of the
>>>> purpose of this effort - to harden the kernel against flaws in
>>>> userspace. Comments along the line of "if <userspace> does it right
>>>> then your patch is pointless" are not relevant to the context of
>>>> securing kernel functions/interfaces. What userspace should do has
>>>> little bearing on defensive measures actually implemented in the
>>>> kernel - if we took the approach of "someone else is responsible for
>>>> that" in military operations, the world would be a much darker and
>>>> different place today. Those who have the luxury of standoff from the
>>>> critical impacts of security vulnerabilities may not take into account
>>>> the fact that peoples lives literally depend on Linux getting a lot
>>>> more secure, and quickly.
>>> You are not going to help anyone with a kernel configuration that
>>> breaks agetty, csh, xemacs and tcsh. The opportunities for using
>>> such a configuration are limited.
>> This patch does not break these programs as you imply. 99% of users of these
>> programs will not be effected. Its not like the TIOCSTI ioctl is a critical
>> part of these programs.
> 
> Most likely not.
> 
>>
>> Also as I've stated elsewhere, this is not breaking userspace because this
>> Kconfig/sysctl defaults to n. If someone is using the programs listed above in
>> a way that does utilize an unprivileged call to the TIOCSTI ioctl, they can
>> turn this feature off.
> 
> Default "off" does not mean it doesn't break userspace. It means that it might
> not break userspace in your environment. Or it might, depending on the whim of
> the build tool of the day.
> 

By this logic, it seems like any introduced feature which toggles some security
feature could be seen as "breaking userspace." For example:

1. Let there exist a LSM X that is set to "off" by default.
	(let's say its a simpler type of MAC ;)
2. There exists an inexperienced user Bob that toggles X to "on".
3. Bob complains that X has broken userspace because he now cannot access his
SSH key from firefox.

build tool's will always have important impacts on a system based on the config
that is used.

My understanding of the "don't break userspace" rule has always been to not
change existing, userspace facing, APIs/ioctls/system calls/etc. I don't
believe that my patch does this.

>>
>>>> If this work were not valuable, it wouldnt be an enabled kernel option
>>>> on a massive number of kernels with attack surfaces reduced by the
>>>> compound protections offered by the grsec patch set.
>>> I'll bet you a beverage that 99-44/100% of the people who have
>>> this enabled have no clue that it's even there. And if they did,
>>> most of them would turn it off.
>>>
>> First, I don't know how to parse "99-44/100%" and therefore do not wish to
>> wager a beverage on such confusing odds ;)
> 
> 99.44%. And I loose a *lot* of beverage bets.
> 
>> Second, as stated above, this feature is off by default. However, I would expect
>> this sysctl to show up in lists of procedures for hardening linux servers.
> 
> It's esoteric enough that I expect that if anyone got bitten by it
> word would get out and no one would use it thereafter.
> 

As we know in the security world, esoteric things can have major a impact. I
have not looked thought all of these, but I imagine most of them could have
been prevented by this patch.

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=tiocsti

>>
>>>> I can't speak for
>>>> the grsec people, but having read a small fraction of the commentary
>>>> around the subject of mainline integration, it seems to me that NAKs
>>>> like this are exactly why they had no interest in even trying - this
>>>> review is based on the cultural views of the kernel community, not on
>>>> the security benefits offered by the work in the current state of
>>>> affairs (where userspace is broken).
>>> A security clamp-down that breaks important stuff is going
>>> to have a tough row to hoe going upstream. Same with a performance
>>> enhancement that breaks things.
>>>
>>>> The purpose of each of these
>>>> protections (being ported over from grsec) is not to offer carte
>>>> blanche defense against all attackers and vectors, but to prevent
>>>> specific classes of bugs from reducing the security posture of the
>>>> system. By implementing these defenses in a layered manner we can
>>>> significantly reduce our kernel attack surface.
>>> Sure, but they have to work right. That's an important reason to do
>>> small changes. A change that isn't acceptable can be rejected without
>>> slowing the general progress.
>>>
>>>> Once userspace catches
>>>> up and does things the right way, and has no capacity for doing them
>>>> the wrong way (aka, nothing attackers can use to bypass the proper
>>>> userspace behavior), then the functionality really does become
>>>> pointless, and can then be removed.
>>> Well, until someone comes along with yet another spiffy feature
>>> like containers and breaks it again. This is why a really good
>>> solution is required, and the one proposed isn't up to snuff.
>>>
>> Can you please state your reasons for why you believe this solution is not "up
>> to snuff?" So far myself and others have given what I believe to be sound
>> responses to any objections to this patch.
> 
> If you can't convince Alan, who know ways more about ttys than anyone
> ought to, it's not up to snuff.
> 
>>
>>>> >From a practical perspective, can alternative solutions be offered
>>>> along with NAKs?
>>> They often are, but let's face it, not everyone has the time,
>>> desire and/or expertise to solve every problem that comes up.
>>>
>>>> Killing things on the vine isnt great, and if a
>>>> security measure is being denied, upstream should provide their
>>>> solution to how they want to address the problem (or just an outline
>>>> to guide the hardened folks).
>>> The impact of a "security measure" can exceed the value provided.
>>> That is, I understand, the basis of the NAK. We need to be careful
>>> to keep in mind that, until such time as there is substantial interest
>>> in the sort of systemic changes that truly remove this class of issue,
>>> we're going to have to justify the risk/reward trade off when we try
>>> to introduce a change.
>>>
>>>> On Mon, May 29, 2017 at 6:26 PM, Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk> wrote:
>>>>> On Mon, 29 May 2017 17:38:00 -0400
>>>>> Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> This introduces the tiocsti_restrict sysctl, whose default is controlled
>>>>>> via CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT. When activated, this control
>>>>>> restricts all TIOCSTI ioctl calls from non CAP_SYS_ADMIN users.
>>>>> Which is really quite pointless as I keep pointing out and you keep
>>>>> reposting this nonsense.
>>>>>
>>>>>> This patch depends on patch 1/2
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This patch was inspired from GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This patch would have prevented
>>>>>> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1411256 under the following
>>>>>> conditions:
>>>>>> * non-privileged container
>>>>>> * container run inside new user namespace
>>>>> And assuming no other ioctl could be used in an attack. Only there are
>>>>> rather a lot of ways an app with access to a tty can cause mischief if
>>>>> it's the same controlling tty as the higher privileged context that
>>>>> launched it.
>>>>>
>>>>> Properly written code allocates a new pty/tty pair for the lower
>>>>> privileged session. If the code doesn't do that then your change merely
>>>>> modifies the degree of mayhem it can cause. If it does it right then your
>>>>> patch is pointless.
>>>>>
>>>>>> Possible effects on userland:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There could be a few user programs that would be effected by this
>>>>>> change.
>>>>> In other words, it's yet another weird config option that breaks stuff.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> NAK v7.
>>>>>
>>>>> Alan
>>>>
>> Thanks,
>> Matt Brown
>>
> 

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