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Message-ID: <20170531153549.GB31189@mail.hallyn.com>
Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 10:35:49 -0500
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc: Peter Dolding <oiaohm@...il.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
Masanobu Koike <masanobu2.koike@...hiba.co.jp>,
james.l.morris@...cle.com, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/3] WhiteEgret LSM module
Quoting Casey Schaufler (casey@...aufler-ca.com):
>
>
> On 5/31/2017 3:59 AM, Peter Dolding wrote:
> > ...
> >
> > Like you see here in Australian government policy there is another
> > thing called whitelisted.
> > https://www.asd.gov.au/publications/protect/top_4_mitigations_linux.htm
> > Matthew Garrett you might want to call IMA whitelisting Australian
> > government for one does not agree. IMA is signed. The difference
> > between signed and white-listed is you might have signed a lot more
> > than what a particular system is white-listed to allowed used.
> >
> To be clear, I'm all for a security module to support this policy.
> As the explicit requirement is for a whitelist, as opposed to allowing
> for a properly configured system*, you can't use any of the existing
> technologies to meet it. This kind of thing** is why we have a LSM
> infrastructure.
>
> Unfortunately, the implementation proposed has very serious issues.
> You can't do access control from userspace. You can't count on
> identifying programs strictly by pathname. It's much more complicated
> than it needs to be for the task.
>
> Suggestion:
>
> Create an security module that looks for the attribute
>
> security.WHITELISTED
Bonus, you can have EVM verify the validity of these xattrs, and
IMA verify the interity of the file itself.
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