linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.2 074/101] xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL replay

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <lsq.1496331655.956937945@decadent.org.uk>
Date:   Thu, 01 Jun 2017 16:40:55 +0100
From:   Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC:     akpm@...ux-foundation.org, "Andy Whitcroft" <apw@...onical.com>,
        "Steffen Klassert" <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>,
        "Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH 3.2 074/101] xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE
 XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL  replay_window

3.2.89-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Whitcroft <apw@...onical.com>

commit 677e806da4d916052585301785d847c3b3e6186a upstream.

When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we
validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid
and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated
buffer.  However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a
XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call.  There we again validate the size of the supplied
buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents.  We do
not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated
memory.  This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by
netlink packets.  This leads to memory corruption and the potential for
priviledge escalation.

We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in
xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len().  This confirms that the user
is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which
includes the replay_esn.  It however does not check the replay_window
remains within that buffer.  Add validation of the contained
replay_window.

CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@...onical.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -393,6 +393,9 @@ static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len
 	if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
 		return -EINVAL;

+	if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	return 0;
 }