linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 3/4] arm64/kasan: don't allocate extra shadow memory

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Message-ID: <31a41822-35e1-1b4a-09f7-0a99571ee89a@virtuozzo.com>
Date:   Thu, 1 Jun 2017 20:00:09 +0300
From:   Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>
To:     Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
CC:     Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
        "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] arm64/kasan: don't allocate extra shadow memory



On 06/01/2017 07:59 PM, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
> 
> 
> On 06/01/2017 07:52 PM, Mark Rutland wrote:
>> On Thu, Jun 01, 2017 at 06:45:32PM +0200, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 6:34 PM, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com> wrote:
>>>> On Thu, Jun 01, 2017 at 07:23:37PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
>>>>> We used to read several bytes of the shadow memory in advance.
>>>>> Therefore additional shadow memory mapped to prevent crash if
>>>>> speculative load would happen near the end of the mapped shadow memory.
>>>>>
>>>>> Now we don't have such speculative loads, so we no longer need to map
>>>>> additional shadow memory.
>>>>
>>>> I see that patch 1 fixed up the Linux helpers for outline
>>>> instrumentation.
>>>>
>>>> Just to check, is it also true that the inline instrumentation never
>>>> performs unaligned accesses to the shadow memory?
>>>
> 
> Correct, inline instrumentation assumes that all accesses are properly aligned as it
> required by C standard. I knew that the kernel violates this rule in many places,
> therefore I decided to add checks for unaligned accesses in outline case.
> 
> 
>>> Inline instrumentation generally accesses only a single byte.
>>
>> Sorry to be a little pedantic, but does that mean we'll never access the
>> additional shadow, or does that mean it's very unlikely that we will?
>>
>> I'm guessing/hoping it's the former!
>>
> 
> Outline will never access additional shadow byte: https://github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizerAlgorithm#unaligned-accesses

s/Outline/inline  of course.

> 
>> Thanks,
>> Mark.
>>