linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM

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Date:   Sat, 3 Jun 2017 07:33:55 +0100
From:   Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
To:     Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>
Cc:     james.l.morris@...cle.com, serge@...lyn.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM

On Sat, Jun 03, 2017 at 01:53:51AM -0400, Matt Brown wrote:

> +static int tpe_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> +{
> +	struct file *file = bprm->file;
> +	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
> +	struct inode *file_inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry);

Bloody wonderful.  Do tell, what *does* prevent a race with rename(2) here,
somehow making sure that your 'inode' won't get freed right under you?