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Message-ID: <b15e8924-4069-b5fa-adb2-86c164b1dd36@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2017 18:06:50 -0400
From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
kexec@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, linux-mm@...ck.org,
iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@....com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Larry Woodman <lwoodman@...hat.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
xen-devel <xen-devel@...ts.xen.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against
just the physical address in cr3
On 06/07/2017 03:14 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> The cr3 register entry can contain the SME encryption bit that indicates
> the PGD is encrypted. The encryption bit should not be used when creating
> a virtual address for the PGD table.
>
> Create a new function, read_cr3_pa(), that will extract the physical
> address from the cr3 register. This function is then used where a virtual
> address of the PGD needs to be created/used from the cr3 register.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 9 +++++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 10 +++++-----
> arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c | 6 +++---
> 7 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
> index 12af3e3..d8e8ace 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
> @@ -234,6 +234,15 @@ static inline void clwb(volatile void *__p)
>
> #define nop() asm volatile ("nop")
>
> +static inline unsigned long native_read_cr3_pa(void)
> +{
> + return (native_read_cr3() & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK);
> +}
> +
> +static inline unsigned long read_cr3_pa(void)
> +{
> + return (read_cr3() & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK);
> +}
>
> #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
> index 43b7002..dc03624 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
> @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
> pmdval_t pmd, *pmd_p;
>
> /* Invalid address or early pgt is done ? */
> - if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3() != __pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
> + if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3_pa() != __pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
> return -1;
>
> again:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> index 8ad91a0..2a1fa10c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
> @@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ static noinline int vmalloc_fault(unsigned long address)
> * Do _not_ use "current" here. We might be inside
> * an interrupt in the middle of a task switch..
> */
> - pgd_paddr = read_cr3();
> + pgd_paddr = read_cr3_pa();
> pmd_k = vmalloc_sync_one(__va(pgd_paddr), address);
> if (!pmd_k)
> return -1;
> @@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static bool low_pfn(unsigned long pfn)
>
> static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
> {
> - pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3());
> + pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3_pa());
> pgd_t *pgd = &base[pgd_index(address)];
> p4d_t *p4d;
> pud_t *pud;
> @@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static noinline int vmalloc_fault(unsigned long address)
> * happen within a race in page table update. In the later
> * case just flush:
> */
> - pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3()) + pgd_index(address);
> + pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3_pa()) + pgd_index(address);
> pgd_ref = pgd_offset_k(address);
> if (pgd_none(*pgd_ref))
> return -1;
> @@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static int bad_address(void *p)
>
> static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
> {
> - pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3() & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK);
> + pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3_pa());
> pgd_t *pgd = base + pgd_index(address);
> p4d_t *p4d;
> pud_t *pud;
> @@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int is_f00f_bug(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
> pgd_t *pgd;
> pte_t *pte;
>
> - pgd = __va(read_cr3() & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK);
> + pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
> pgd += pgd_index(address);
>
> pte = lookup_address_in_pgd(pgd, address, &level);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> index 2a0fa89..e6305dd 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> @@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
> static inline pmd_t * __init early_ioremap_pmd(unsigned long addr)
> {
> /* Don't assume we're using swapper_pg_dir at this point */
> - pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3());
> + pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3_pa());
> pgd_t *pgd = &base[pgd_index(addr)];
> p4d_t *p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
> pud_t *pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c b/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c
> index c5350fd..0668aaf 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-pm.c
> @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static int xo1_power_state_enter(suspend_state_t pm_state)
>
> asmlinkage __visible int xo1_do_sleep(u8 sleep_state)
> {
> - void *pgd_addr = __va(read_cr3());
> + void *pgd_addr = __va(read_cr3_pa());
>
> /* Program wakeup mask (using dword access to CS5536_PM1_EN) */
> outl(wakeup_mask << 16, acpi_base + CS5536_PM1_STS);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c
> index a6e21fe..0a7650d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c
> @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static int relocate_restore_code(void)
> memcpy((void *)relocated_restore_code, &core_restore_code, PAGE_SIZE);
>
> /* Make the page containing the relocated code executable */
> - pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3()) + pgd_index(relocated_restore_code);
> + pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3_pa()) + pgd_index(relocated_restore_code);
> p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, relocated_restore_code);
> if (p4d_large(*p4d)) {
> set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(p4d_val(*p4d) & ~_PAGE_NX));
> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
> index 1f386d7..2dc5243 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
> @@ -2022,7 +2022,7 @@ static phys_addr_t __init xen_early_virt_to_phys(unsigned long vaddr)
> pmd_t pmd;
> pte_t pte;
>
> - pa = read_cr3();
> + pa = read_cr3_pa();
> pgd = native_make_pgd(xen_read_phys_ulong(pa + pgd_index(vaddr) *
> sizeof(pgd)));
> if (!pgd_present(pgd))
> @@ -2102,7 +2102,7 @@ void __init xen_relocate_p2m(void)
> pt_phys = pmd_phys + PFN_PHYS(n_pmd);
> p2m_pfn = PFN_DOWN(pt_phys) + n_pt;
>
> - pgd = __va(read_cr3());
> + pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
> new_p2m = (unsigned long *)(2 * PGDIR_SIZE);
> idx_p4d = 0;
> save_pud = n_pud;
> @@ -2209,7 +2209,7 @@ static void __init xen_write_cr3_init(unsigned long cr3)
> {
> unsigned long pfn = PFN_DOWN(__pa(swapper_pg_dir));
>
> - BUG_ON(read_cr3() != __pa(initial_page_table));
> + BUG_ON(read_cr3_pa() != __pa(initial_page_table));
> BUG_ON(cr3 != __pa(swapper_pg_dir));
>
> /*
(Please copy Xen maintainers when modifying xen-related files.)
Given that page tables for Xen PV guests are controlled by the
hypervisor I don't think this change (although harmless) is necessary.
What may be needed is making sure X86_FEATURE_SME is not set for PV guests.
-boris
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