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Message-ID: <1691714.1h4IbvMDSf@tauon.chronox.de>
Date: Wed, 07 Jun 2017 07:00:17 +0200
From: Stephan Müller <smueller@...onox.de>
To: Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@....eng.br>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using
Am Mittwoch, 7. Juni 2017, 00:19:10 CEST schrieb Henrique de Moraes Holschuh:
Hi Henrique,
> On that same idea, one could add an early_initramfs handler for entropy
> data.
Any data that comes from outside during the boot process, be it some NVRAM
location, the /var/lib...seed file for /dev/random or other approaches are
viewed by a number of folks to have zero bits of entropy.
I.e. this data is nice for stirring the pool, but is not considered to help
our entropy problem.
Ciao
Stephan
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