linux-kernel - Re: "selinux: support distinctions among all network address families" causing existing bluetooth sepolicies to not work properly with Android?

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Message-ID: <CALAqxLWvgY2xSkeBpK3GCAyqOeyrKVy5FCJ-zoy4_78hhG6kzg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 7 Jun 2017 12:40:52 -0700
From:   John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org>
To:     Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Cc:     Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@...gle.com>,
        Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@...roid.com>,
        Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>,
        lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Satish Patel <satish.patel@...aro.org>,
        Rob Herring <rob.herring@...aro.org>
Subject: Re: "selinux: support distinctions among all network address
 families" causing existing bluetooth sepolicies to not work properly with Android?

On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 7:44 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> On Wed, 2017-06-07 at 08:40 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On Tue, 2017-06-06 at 17:45 -0700, John Stultz wrote:
>> > Hey folks,
>> >
>> > Recently I was working to validate/enable a new bluetooth HAL on
>> > HiKey
>> > with Android, and after getting it working properly with a 4.9
>> > based
>> > kernel, I found that I was seeing failures trying to run with an
>> > upstream (4.12-rc3 based) kernel.
>> >
>> > It seemed a call to:
>> >    socket(AF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_RAW, BTPROTO_HCI);
>> >
>> > was suddenly failing, and running "setenforce 0" would allow it to
>> > continue properly.
>> >
>> > I chased the issue down to  da69a5306ab9 ("selinux: support
>> > distinctions among all network address families"). And work around
>> > it
>> > with the following (whitespace corrupted, sorry) hack:
>> >
>> > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> > index e67a526..42dfd0f 100644
>> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> > @@ -1379,8 +1379,8 @@ static inline u16
>> > socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
>> >                         return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
>> >                 case PF_TIPC:
>> >                         return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
>> > -               case PF_BLUETOOTH:
>> > -                       return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
>> > +//             case PF_BLUETOOTH:
>> > +//                     return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
>> >                 case PF_IUCV:
>> >                         return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
>> >                 case PF_RXRPC:
>> >
>> > Obviously this isn't ideal. The commit message claims that "
>> > Backward
>> > compatibility is provided by only enabling the finer-grained socket
>> > classes if a new policy capability is set in the policy; older
>> > policies will behave as before."
>> >
>> > Which makes it seem like the older sepolicy should be fine with
>> > newer
>> > kernels, but this doesn't seem to be the case here? Am I missing
>> > something? Is Android doing something odd with their POLICYDB that
>> > is
>> > causing the kernel to think the sepolicy is newer?
>>
>> The code above is only enabled if the policy enables the
>> extended_socket_class policy capability.  I added that to AOSP policy
>> in 431bdd9f2f344ecde4cd3fe0109bd70eab0a394c.  The correct fix is not
>> to
>> change the kernel but rather to add allow rules to policy for the
>> finer-grained socket classes.  Your dmesg or logcat output will show
>> you the denials, and audit2allow can help with an initial cut at
>> rules,
>> although you should refine them to use the macros and, where
>> appropriate, attributes.
>
> To elaborate a bit further: the backward compatibility provision is for
> policies that predate the introduction of the extended_socket_class
> policy capability or that do not opt into it.  Thus, for example,
> Android N and earlier had policies that did not define this capability
> and therefore will fall back to the old behavior and remain compatible.
>  Android O appears to have included the aforementioned sepolicy commit
> from AOSP master and therefore has opted into this functionality and
> must provide appropriate allow rules for it when using a kernel that
> includes this functionality. To do so, one needs to review all allow
> rules on 'socket' and duplicate them with allow rules on the more
> specific per-address-family security classes that are required (which
> can be determined either through testing or code examination).
> Eventually, the original rules on the generic 'socket' class can be
> removed from sepolicy entirely, but not until support for older kernels
> that predate this capability is no longer needed.  One also needs to
> review all allow rules on rawip_socket and determine whether they
> should be duplicated for sctp_socket and/or icmp_socket if the program
> was in fact using a SCTP or an unprivileged ICMP (ping) socket.


Ah. Ok. Very much appreciate the extra details here! I wasn't
expecting Android's userspace to already have enabled the new sepolicy
rules, so I assumed it must have been some other misstep.

I've reworked the problematic policy file and its now working for me!

Thanks again!
-john