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Message-Id: <20170610025912.6499-3-Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Sat, 10 Jun 2017 04:59:08 +0200
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/6] net/ipv6: use constant time memory comparison for mac
Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
---
net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c b/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c
index f950cb53d5e3..54213c83b44e 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include <net/xfrm.h>
#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <net/seg6.h>
@@ -274,7 +275,7 @@ bool seg6_hmac_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
if (seg6_hmac_compute(hinfo, srh, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, hmac_output))
return false;
- if (memcmp(hmac_output, tlv->hmac, SEG6_HMAC_FIELD_LEN) != 0)
+ if (crypto_memneq(hmac_output, tlv->hmac, SEG6_HMAC_FIELD_LEN))
return false;
return true;
--
2.13.1
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