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Date:   Mon, 12 Jun 2017 17:26:27 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Donald Buczek <buczek@...gen.mpg.de>,
        Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@...marydata.com>,
        Paul Menzel <pmenzel@...gen.mpg.de>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 81/90] NFS: Ensure we revalidate attributes before using execute_ok()

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@...marydata.com>

commit 5c5fc09a1157a11dbe84e6421c3e0b37d05238cb upstream.

Donald Buczek reports that NFS clients can also report incorrect
results for access() due to lack of revalidation of attributes
before calling execute_ok().
Looking closely, it seems chdir() is afflicted with the same problem.

Fix is to ensure we call nfs_revalidate_inode_rcu() or
nfs_revalidate_inode() as appropriate before deciding to trust
execute_ok().

Reported-by: Donald Buczek <buczek@...gen.mpg.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1451331530-3748-1-git-send-email-buczek@molgen.mpg.de
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@...marydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@...gen.mpg.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/nfs/dir.c |   18 ++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/nfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c
@@ -2421,6 +2421,20 @@ int nfs_may_open(struct inode *inode, st
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfs_may_open);
 
+static int nfs_execute_ok(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+	struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
+	int ret;
+
+	if (mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK)
+		ret = nfs_revalidate_inode_rcu(server, inode);
+	else
+		ret = nfs_revalidate_inode(server, inode);
+	if (ret == 0 && !execute_ok(inode))
+		ret = -EACCES;
+	return ret;
+}
+
 int nfs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
 	struct rpc_cred *cred;
@@ -2470,8 +2484,8 @@ force_lookup:
 			res = PTR_ERR(cred);
 	}
 out:
-	if (!res && (mask & MAY_EXEC) && !execute_ok(inode))
-		res = -EACCES;
+	if (!res && (mask & MAY_EXEC))
+		res = nfs_execute_ok(inode, mask);
 
 	dfprintk(VFS, "NFS: permission(%s/%lu), mask=0x%x, res=%d\n",
 		inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, mask, res);


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