Message-Id: <1497286620-15027-2-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 12 Jun 2017 18:56:50 +0200
From:   Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
        Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>,
        Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>,
        PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Subject: [PATCH 01/11] S.A.R.A. Documentation

Adding documentation for S.A.R.A. LSM.

Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  40 +++++
 Documentation/security/00-INDEX                 |   2 +
 Documentation/security/SARA.rst                 | 192 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 234 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/security/SARA.rst

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 0f5c3b4..f3ee12d 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3702,6 +3702,46 @@
 			1 -- enable.
 			Default value is set via kernel config option.
 
+	sara=		[SARA] Disable or enable S.A.R.A. at boot time.
+			If disabled this way S.A.R.A. can't be enabled
+			again.
+			Format: { "0" | "1" }
+			See security/sara/Kconfig help text
+			0 -- disable.
+			1 -- enable.
+			Default value is set via kernel config option.
+
+	sara_usb_filtering= [SARA]
+			Disable or enable S.A.R.A. USB Filtering at boot
+			time.
+			Format: { "0" | "1" }
+			See security/sara/Kconfig help text
+			0 -- disable.
+			1 -- enable.
+			Default value is 1.
+
+	sara_usb_filtering_default= [SARA]
+			Set S.A.R.A. USB Filtering default action.
+			Format: { "a" | "d" }
+			See security/sara/Kconfig help text
+			a -- allow.
+			d -- deny.
+			Default value is set via kernel config option.
+
+	sara_wxprot=	[SARA] Disable or enable S.A.R.A. WX Protection
+			at boot time.
+			Format: { "0" | "1" }
+			See security/sara/Kconfig help text
+			0 -- disable.
+			1 -- enable.
+			Default value is 1.
+
+	sara_wxprot_default_flags= [SARA]
+			Set S.A.R.A. WX Protection default flags.
+			Format: <integer>
+			See S.A.R.A. documentation.
+			Default value is set via kernel config option.
+
 	serialnumber	[BUGS=X86-32]
 
 	shapers=	[NET]
diff --git a/Documentation/security/00-INDEX b/Documentation/security/00-INDEX
index 45c82fd..fe3583c 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/00-INDEX
+++ b/Documentation/security/00-INDEX
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ Yama.txt
 	- documentation on the Yama Linux Security Module.
 apparmor.txt
 	- documentation on the AppArmor security extension.
+SARA.rst
+	- documentation on the S.A.R.A. Linux Security Module.
 credentials.txt
 	- documentation about credentials in Linux.
 keys-ecryptfs.txt
diff --git a/Documentation/security/SARA.rst b/Documentation/security/SARA.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1523033
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/security/SARA.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+========
+S.A.R.A.
+========
+
+S.A.R.A. (S.A.R.A. is Another Recursive Acronym) is a stacked Linux Security
+Module that aims to collect heterogeneous security measures, providing a common
+interface to manage them.
+As of today it consists of two main submodules:
+
+- USB Filtering
+- WX Protection
+
+
+The kernel-space part is complemented by its user-space counterpart: `saractl` [2]_.
+A test suite for WX Protection, called `sara-test` [4]_, is also available.
+More information about where to find these tools and the full S.A.R.A.
+documentation are in the `External Links and Documentation`_ section.
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+S.A.R.A.'s Submodules
+=====================
+
+USB Filtering
+-------------
+USB Filtering aims to provide a mechanism to decide which USB devices should
+be authorized to connect to the system and which shouldn't. The main goal
+is to narrow the attack surface for custom USB devices designed to exploit
+vulnerabilities found in some USB device drivers.
+
+Via configuration it's possible to allow or to deny authorization, based
+on one or more of: Vendor ID, Product ID, bus name and port number. There
+is also limited support for wildcards.
+Depending on the configuration, it can work both as a white list or as a black
+list.
+With the help of `saractl` [2]_ it's also possible to completely disable new
+USB devices when the screen is "locked".
+The original idea is inspired by the Grsecurity "Deny USB" feature.
+For further information on configuration file format and user-space utilities
+please look at the full documentation [1]_.
+
+
+WX Protection
+-------------
+WX Protection aims to improve user-space programs security by applying:
+
+- `W^X enforcement`_
+- `W!->X (once writable never executable) mprotect restriction`_
+- `Executable MMAP prevention`_
+
+All of the above features can be enabled or disabled both system wide
+or on a per executable basis through the use of configuration files managed by
+`saractl` [2]_.
+
+It is important to note that some programs may have issues working with
+WX Protection. In particular:
+
+- **W^X enforcement** will cause problems to any programs that needs
+  memory pages mapped both as writable and executable at the same time e.g.
+  programs with executable stack markings in the *PT_GNU_STACK* segment.
+- **W!->X mprotect restriction** will cause problems to any program that
+  needs to generate executable code at run time or to modify executable
+  pages e.g. programs with a *JIT* compiler built-in or linked against a
+  *non-PIC* library.
+- **Executable MMAP prevention** can work only with programs that have at least
+  partial *RELRO* support. It's disabled automatically for programs that
+  lack this feature. It will cause problems to any program that uses *dlopen*
+  or tries to do an executable mmap. Unfortunately this feature is the one
+  that could create most problems and should be enabled only after careful
+  evaluation.
+
+To extend the scope of the above features, despite the issues that they may
+cause, they are complemented by **/proc/PID/attr/sara/wxprot** interface
+and **trampoline emulation**.
+
+At the moment, WX Protection (unless specified otherwise) runs on `x86_64` and
+`x86_32` (with PAE).
+
+Parts of WX Protection are inspired by some of the features available in PaX.
+
+For further information about configuration file format and user-space
+utilities please take a look at the full documentation [1]_.
+
+W^X enforcement
+----------------------
+W^X means that a program can't have a page of memory that is marked, at the
+same time, writable and executable. This also allow to detect many bad
+behaviours that make life much more easy for attackers. Programs running with
+this feature enabled will be more difficult to exploit in the case they are
+affected by some vulnerabilities, because the attacker will be forced
+to make more steps in order to exploit them.
+
+W!->X (once writable never executable) mprotect restriction
+-----------------------------------------------------------
+"Once writable never executable" means that any page that could have been
+marked as writable in the past won't ever be allowed to be marked (e.g. via
+an mprotect syscall) as executable.
+This goes on the same track as W^X, but is much stricter and prevents
+the runtime creation of new executable code in memory.
+Obviously, this feature does not prevent a program from creating a new file and
+*mmapping* it as executable, however, it will be way more difficult for attackers
+to exploit vulnerabilities if this feature is enabled.
+
+Executable MMAP prevention
+--------------------------
+This feature prevents the creation of new executable mmaps after the dynamic
+libraries have been loaded. When used in combination with **W!->X mprotect
+restriction** this feature will completely prevent the creation of new
+executable code in the current program.
+Obviously, this feature does not prevent cases in which an attacker uses an
+*execve* to start a completely new program. This kind of restriction, if
+needed, can be applied using one of the other LSM that focuses on MAC.
+Please be aware that this feature can break many programs and so it should be
+enabled after careful evaluation.
+
+/proc/PID/attr/sara/wxprot interface
+------------------------------------
+The `procattr` interface can be used by a program to discover which
+WX Protection features are enabled and/or to tighten them: protection
+can't be softened via procattr.
+The interface is simple: it's a text file with an hexadecimal
+number in it representing enabled features (more information can be
+found in the `Flags values`_ section). Via this interface it is also
+possible to perform a complete memory scan to remove the write permission
+from pages that are both writable and executable.
+
+Protections that prevent the runtime creation of executable code
+can be troublesome for all those programs that actually need to do it
+e.g. programs shipping with a JIT compiler built-in.
+Given that it's possible to segregate the part that runs untrusted
+code from the rest through a fork, this feature can be use to run the JIT
+compiler with few restrictions while enforcing full WX Protection in the
+rest of the program.
+
+The preferred way to access this interface is via `saralib` [3]_.
+If you don't want it as a dependency, you can just statically link it
+in your project or copy/paste parts of it.
+To make things simpler `saralib` is the only part of S.A.R.A. released under
+*CC0 - No Rights Reserved* license.
+
+Trampoline emulation
+--------------------
+Some programs need to generate part of their code at runtime. Luckily enough,
+in some cases they only generate well-known code sequences (the
+*trampolines*) that can be easily recognized and emulated by the kernel.
+This way WX Protection can still be active, so a potential attacker won't be
+able to generate arbitrary sequences of code, but just those that are
+explicitly allowed. This is not ideal, but it's still better than having WX
+Protection completely disabled.
+
+In particular S.A.R.A. is able to recognize trampolines used by GCC for nested
+C functions and libffi's trampolines.
+This feature is available only on x86_32 and x86_64.
+
+Flags values
+------------
+Flags are represented as a 16 bit unsigned integer in which every bit indicates
+the status of a given feature:
+
++------------------------------+----------+
+|           Feature            |  Value   |
++==============================+==========+
+| W!->X Heap                   |  0x0001  |
++------------------------------+----------+
+| W!->X Stack                  |  0x0002  |
++------------------------------+----------+
+| W!->X Other memory           |  0x0004  |
++------------------------------+----------+
+| W^X                          |  0x0008  |
++------------------------------+----------+
+| Don't enforce, just complain |  0x0010  |
++------------------------------+----------+
+| Be Verbose                   |  0x0020  |
++------------------------------+----------+
+| Executable MMAP prevention   |  0x0040  |
++------------------------------+----------+
+| Force W^X on setprocattr     |  0x0080  |
++------------------------------+----------+
+| Trampoline emulation         |  0x0100  |
++------------------------------+----------+
+| Children will inherit flags  |  0x0200  |
++------------------------------+----------+
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+External Links and Documentation
+================================
+
+.. [1] `Documentation	<https://github.com/smeso/sara-doc>`_
+.. [2] `saractl		<https://github.com/smeso/saractl>`_
+.. [3] `saralib		<https://github.com/smeso/saralib>`_
+.. [4] `sara-test	<https://github.com/smeso/sara-test>`_
-- 
1.9.1

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