linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Tue, 13 Jun 2017 14:51:40 -0600
From:   Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>
To:     Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc:     "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, lkp@...org,
        containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org, xiaolong.ye@...el.com,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities

On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 01:42:24PM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> On 06/13/2017 01:14 PM, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> > Hi Stefan,
> > 
> > On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 11:47:26AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > > On 05/08/2017 02:11 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > > Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
> > > > security.capability xattr.  If it were allowed to do so, then any
> > > > unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private
> > > > namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
> > > > host.
> > > > 
> > > > However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
> > > > desirable.  Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with
> > > > limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and
> > > > dropping privilege.  For instance a program installer must detect
> > > > whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set
> > > > setuid-root otherwise.  The program in turn must know how to drop
> > > > partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root.
> > > Hi Serge,
> > > 
> > > 
> > >    I have been looking at patch below primarily to learn how we could apply a
> > > similar technique to security.ima and security.evm for a namespaced IMA.
> > >  From the paragraphs above I thought that you solved the problem of a shared
> > > filesystem where one now can write different security.capability xattrs by
> > > effectively supporting for example security.capability[uid=1000] and
> > > security.capability[uid=2000] written into the filesystem. Each would then
> > > become visible as security.capability if the userns mapping is set
> > > appropriately.
> > One disadvantage of this approach is that whoever is setting up the
> > container would need to go touch the security.ima attribute for each
> > file in the contianer, which would slow down container creation time.
> > For capabilities this makes sense, because you might want the file to
> > have different capabilities in different namespaces, but for IMA,
> > since the file hash will be the same in every namespace, it would be
> > nice to use a design that avoids touching each file on new ns
> > creation.
> 
> Actually IMA in appraisal mode also supports signatures in the extended
> attributes. Depending on which (public) keys you put on the IMA keyring for
> a namespaced IMA, you may need a different signature on a file to be able to
> access it (execute it for example). For this to work containers would have
> to be able to ship with security.ima xattrs embedded in them and users
> should be able to apply signatures on files on a running container (or while
> building it).

Yes, we will definitely support shipping images with the security.ima
xattrs set when namespaced support is available in the kernel.

> I worked on a prototype for namespaces IMA before where one of
> the issues was the CAP_SYS_ADMIN gate that disallows setting of security.ima
> when dropped. So some form of exception would have to be granted to be
> allowed to set security.ima from inside a container while CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> isn't there. And of course we need to protect the host's filesystem from an
> attack where the user just modifies the security.ima signature associated
> with a file.

At least initially, I think it would be fine to require
capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); right now the container engine is the one
responsible for setting up the container's rootfs (via downloading an
image and extracting it), and these typically run as root.

Eventually it would be great to relax this, because
"unprivileged/rootless" containers are a thing people are interested
in, but as a first cut I'm not sure it's necessary.

Cheers, and thanks for looking at this!

Tycho