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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.20.1706141846530.27733@namei.org>
Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2017 18:47:08 +1000 (AEST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
David Safford <safford@...ibm.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] security/keys: use constant time
memory comparison for macs
On Sat, 10 Jun 2017, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
> Cc: David Safford <safford@...ibm.com>
> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
> Cc: keyrings@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
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