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Message-Id: <1497542445.4287.55.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2017 12:00:45 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-ima-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
Jessica Yu <jeyu@...hat.com>,
Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
"AKASHI, Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@...aro.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/6] integrity: Small code improvements
On Wed, 2017-06-07 at 22:49 -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> These changes are too small to warrant their own patches:
>
> The keyid and sig_size members of struct signature_v2_hdr are in BE format,
> so use a type that makes this assumption explicit. Also, use beXX_to_cpu
> instead of __beXX_to_cpu to read them.
>
> Change integrity_kernel_read to take a void * buffer instead of char *
> buffer, so that callers don't have to use a cast if they provide a buffer
> that isn't a char *.
>
> Add missing #endif comment in ima.h pointing out which macro it refers to.
>
> Add missing fall through comment in ima_appraise.c.
>
> Constify mask_tokens and func_tokens arrays.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Thank you. Queued to be upstreamed.
Mimi
> ---
> security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 4 ++--
> security/integrity/iint.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 1 +
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 ++--
> security/integrity/integrity.h | 7 ++++---
> 6 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> index 80052ed8d467..ab6a029062a1 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> @@ -92,13 +92,13 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
>
> siglen -= sizeof(*hdr);
>
> - if (siglen != __be16_to_cpu(hdr->sig_size))
> + if (siglen != be16_to_cpu(hdr->sig_size))
> return -EBADMSG;
>
> if (hdr->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
> return -ENOPKG;
>
> - key = request_asymmetric_key(keyring, __be32_to_cpu(hdr->keyid));
> + key = request_asymmetric_key(keyring, be32_to_cpu(hdr->keyid));
> if (IS_ERR(key))
> return PTR_ERR(key);
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
> index c710d22042f9..6fc888ca468e 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/iint.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
> @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ security_initcall(integrity_iintcache_init);
> *
> */
> int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
> - char *addr, unsigned long count)
> + void *addr, unsigned long count)
> {
> mm_segment_t old_fs;
> char __user *buf = (char __user *)addr;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index d26a30e37d13..215a93c41b51 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> return 0;
> }
>
> -#endif
> +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
>
> /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
> #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index 7fe0566142d8..ea36a4f134f4 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
> case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
> /* first byte contains algorithm id */
> hash_start = 1;
> + /* fall through */
> case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
> if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
> cause = "IMA-signature-required";
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 0acd68decb17..949ad3858327 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -965,7 +965,7 @@ enum {
> mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append
> };
>
> -static char *mask_tokens[] = {
> +static const char *const mask_tokens[] = {
> "MAY_EXEC",
> "MAY_WRITE",
> "MAY_READ",
> @@ -979,7 +979,7 @@ enum {
> func_policy
> };
>
> -static char *func_tokens[] = {
> +static const char *const func_tokens[] = {
> "FILE_CHECK",
> "MMAP_CHECK",
> "BPRM_CHECK",
> diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> index 24520b4ef3b0..a53e7e4ab06c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> @@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ struct signature_v2_hdr {
> uint8_t type; /* xattr type */
> uint8_t version; /* signature format version */
> uint8_t hash_algo; /* Digest algorithm [enum hash_algo] */
> - uint32_t keyid; /* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific */
> - uint16_t sig_size; /* signature size */
> + __be32 keyid; /* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific */
> + __be16 sig_size; /* signature size */
> uint8_t sig[0]; /* signature payload */
> } __packed;
>
> @@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
> struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
>
> int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
> - char *addr, unsigned long count);
> + void *addr, unsigned long count);
> +
> int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data);
>
> #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM 0
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