linux-kernel - [PATCH v4 5/7] kasan: allow kasan_check_read/write() to accept pointers to volatiles

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Message-Id: <e5a4c25bda8eccce2317da6d97138bfbea730e64.1497690003.git.dvyukov@google.com>
Date:   Sat, 17 Jun 2017 11:15:31 +0200
From:   Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
To:     mark.rutland@....com, peterz@...radead.org, mingo@...hat.com,
        will.deacon@....com, hpa@...or.com, aryabinin@...tuozzo.com,
        kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 5/7] kasan: allow kasan_check_read/write() to accept pointers to volatiles

Currently kasan_check_read/write() accept 'const void*', make them
accept 'const volatile void*'. This is required for instrumentation
of atomic operations and there is just no reason to not allow that.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: x86@...nel.org
Cc: linux-mm@...ck.org
Cc: kasan-dev@...glegroups.com
---
 include/linux/kasan-checks.h | 10 ++++++----
 mm/kasan/kasan.c             |  4 ++--
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/kasan-checks.h b/include/linux/kasan-checks.h
index b7f8aced7870..41960fecf783 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan-checks.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan-checks.h
@@ -2,11 +2,13 @@
 #define _LINUX_KASAN_CHECKS_H
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
-void kasan_check_read(const void *p, unsigned int size);
-void kasan_check_write(const void *p, unsigned int size);
+void kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size);
+void kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size);
 #else
-static inline void kasan_check_read(const void *p, unsigned int size) { }
-static inline void kasan_check_write(const void *p, unsigned int size) { }
+static inline void kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
+{ }
+static inline void kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
+{ }
 #endif
 
 #endif
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
index c81549d5c833..edacd161c0e5 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
@@ -333,13 +333,13 @@ static void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr,
 	check_memory_region_inline(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
 }
 
-void kasan_check_read(const void *p, unsigned int size)
+void kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
 {
 	check_memory_region((unsigned long)p, size, false, _RET_IP_);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_check_read);
 
-void kasan_check_write(const void *p, unsigned int size)
+void kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
 {
 	check_memory_region((unsigned long)p, size, true, _RET_IP_);
 }
-- 
2.13.1.518.g3df882009-goog