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Message-ID: <CAJcbSZG8KH7kw5HMP-7HvfHh2RdAfGnOqjOibHr5H42tORRGCw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2017 13:31:14 -0700
From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
Miroslav Benes <mbenes@...e.cz>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
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"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 2/3] arm/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return
On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 1:18 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 6:12 PM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> wrote:
>> Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to
>> user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and
>> elevate privileges [1].
>>
>> The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on
>> return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if
>> needed.
>>
>> The TIF_SETFS flag is added to _TIF_WORK_MASK shifting _TIF_SYSCALL_WORK
>> for arm instruction immediate support. The global work mask is too big
>> to used on a single instruction so adapt ret_fast_syscall.
>>
>> [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>
>> ---
>> v10 redesigns the change to use work flags on set_fs as recommended by
>> Linus and agreed by others.
>>
>> Based on next-20170609
>> ---
>> arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h | 15 +++++++++------
>> arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 2 ++
>> arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S | 9 +++++++--
>> arch/arm/kernel/signal.c | 5 +++++
>> 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h
>> index 776757d1604a..1d468b527b7b 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h
>> +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h
>> @@ -139,10 +139,11 @@ extern int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *,
>> #define TIF_NEED_RESCHED 1 /* rescheduling necessary */
>> #define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME 2 /* callback before returning to user */
>> #define TIF_UPROBE 3 /* breakpointed or singlestepping */
>> -#define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE 4 /* syscall trace active */
>> -#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 5 /* syscall auditing active */
>> -#define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT 6 /* syscall tracepoint instrumentation */
>> -#define TIF_SECCOMP 7 /* seccomp syscall filtering active */
>> +#define TIF_FSCHECK 4 /* Check FS is USER_DS on return */
>> +#define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE 5 /* syscall trace active */
>> +#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 6 /* syscall auditing active */
>> +#define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT 7 /* syscall tracepoint instrumentation */
>> +#define TIF_SECCOMP 8 /* seccomp syscall filtering active */
>>
>> #define TIF_NOHZ 12 /* in adaptive nohz mode */
>> #define TIF_USING_IWMMXT 17
>> @@ -153,6 +154,7 @@ extern int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *,
>> #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
>> #define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME (1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
>> #define _TIF_UPROBE (1 << TIF_UPROBE)
>> +#define _TIF_FSCHECK (1 << TIF_FSCHECK)
>> #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
>> #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
>> #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
>> @@ -166,8 +168,9 @@ extern int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *,
>> /*
>> * Change these and you break ASM code in entry-common.S
>> */
>> -#define _TIF_WORK_MASK (_TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_SIGPENDING | \
>> - _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_UPROBE)
>> +#define _TIF_WORK_MASK (_TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_SIGPENDING | \
>> + _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_UPROBE | \
>> + _TIF_FSCHECK)
>>
>> #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
>> #endif /* __ASM_ARM_THREAD_INFO_H */
>> diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
>> index 2577405d082d..6cc882223e34 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
>> +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
>> @@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
>> {
>> current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs;
>> modify_domain(DOMAIN_KERNEL, fs ? DOMAIN_CLIENT : DOMAIN_MANAGER);
>> + /* On user-mode return, check fs is correct */
>> + set_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK);
>> }
>>
>> #define segment_eq(a, b) ((a) == (b))
>> diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
>> index eb5cd77bf1d8..e33c32d56193 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
>> +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
>> @@ -41,7 +41,9 @@ ret_fast_syscall:
>> UNWIND(.cantunwind )
>> disable_irq_notrace @ disable interrupts
>> ldr r1, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS] @ re-check for syscall tracing
>> - tst r1, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK | _TIF_WORK_MASK
>> + tst r1, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK
>> + bne fast_work_pending
>> + tst r1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK
>
> (IIUC) MOV32 is 2 cycles (MOVW, MOVT), and each TST above is 1 cycle
> and each BNE is 1 cycle (when not taken). So:
>
> mov32 r2, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK | _TIF_WORK_MASK
> tst r1, r2
> bne fast_work_pending
>
> is 4 cycles and tst, bne, tst, bne is also 4 cycles. Would mov32 be
> more readable (since it keeps the flags together)?
I guess it would be more readable. Any opinion from the arm folks?
>
> -Kees
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Pixel Security
--
Thomas
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