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Date:   Tue, 20 Jun 2017 12:24:53 +0530
From:   Anshuman Khandual <khandual@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:     Ram Pai <linuxram@...ibm.com>, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     dave.hansen@...el.com, paulus@...ba.org,
        aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 09/12] powerpc: Deliver SEGV signal on pkey violation.

On 06/17/2017 09:22 AM, Ram Pai wrote:
> The value of the AMR register at the time of exception
> is made available in gp_regs[PT_AMR] of the siginfo.
> 
> This field can be used to reprogram the permission bits of
> any valid pkey.
> 
> Similarly the value of the pkey, whose protection got violated,
> is made available at si_pkey field of the siginfo structure.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@...ibm.com>
> ---
>  arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h        |  1 +
>  arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h |  3 ++-
>  arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c      |  5 ++++
>  arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S   |  8 ++++++
>  arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c        | 14 ++++++++++
>  arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c        | 14 ++++++++++
>  arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c            | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c                |  4 +++
>  8 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h
> index 1c09f8f..a41afd3 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h
> @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ struct paca_struct {
>  	struct dtl_entry *dispatch_log_end;
>  #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64 */
>  	u64 dscr_default;		/* per-CPU default DSCR */
> +	u64 paca_amr;			/* value of amr at exception */
> 
>  #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64
>  	/*
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h
> index 8036b38..7ec2428 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h
> @@ -108,8 +108,9 @@ struct pt_regs {
>  #define PT_DAR	41
>  #define PT_DSISR 42
>  #define PT_RESULT 43
> -#define PT_DSCR 44
>  #define PT_REGS_COUNT 44
> +#define PT_DSCR 44
> +#define PT_AMR	45

PT_REGS_COUNT is not getting incremented even after adding
one more element into the pack ?

> 
>  #define PT_FPR0	48	/* each FP reg occupies 2 slots in this space */
> 
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> index 709e234..17f5d8a 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> @@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ int main(void)
>  	OFFSET(PACAHWCPUID, paca_struct, hw_cpu_id);
>  	OFFSET(PACAKEXECSTATE, paca_struct, kexec_state);
>  	OFFSET(PACA_DSCR_DEFAULT, paca_struct, dscr_default);
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
> +	OFFSET(PACA_AMR, paca_struct, paca_amr);
> +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
> +

So we now have a place in PACA for AMR.

>  	OFFSET(ACCOUNT_STARTTIME, paca_struct, accounting.starttime);
>  	OFFSET(ACCOUNT_STARTTIME_USER, paca_struct, accounting.starttime_user);
>  	OFFSET(ACCOUNT_USER_TIME, paca_struct, accounting.utime);
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
> index 3fd0528..8db9ef8 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
> @@ -493,6 +493,10 @@ EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(data_access_common)
>  	ld	r12,_MSR(r1)
>  	ld	r3,PACA_EXGEN+EX_DAR(r13)
>  	lwz	r4,PACA_EXGEN+EX_DSISR(r13)
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
> +	mfspr	r5,SPRN_AMR
> +	std	r5,PACA_AMR(r13)
> +#endif /*  CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
>  	li	r5,0x300
>  	std	r3,_DAR(r1)
>  	std	r4,_DSISR(r1)
> @@ -561,6 +565,10 @@ EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(instruction_access_common)
>  	ld	r12,_MSR(r1)
>  	ld	r3,_NIP(r1)
>  	andis.	r4,r12,0x5820
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
> +	mfspr	r5,SPRN_AMR
> +	std	r5,PACA_AMR(r13)
> +#endif /*  CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */

Saving the AMR context on page faults, this seems to be
changing in the next patch again based on whether any
key was active at that point and fault happened for the
key enforcement ?

>  	li	r5,0x400
>  	std	r3,_DAR(r1)
>  	std	r4,_DSISR(r1)
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c
> index 97bb138..059766a 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c
> @@ -500,6 +500,11 @@ static int save_user_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, struct mcontext __user *frame,
>  				   (unsigned long) &frame->tramp[2]);
>  	}
> 
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
> +	if (__put_user(get_paca()->paca_amr, &frame->mc_gregs[PT_AMR]))
> +		return 1;
> +#endif /*  CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
> +
>  	return 0;
>  }
> 
> @@ -661,6 +666,9 @@ static long restore_user_regs(struct pt_regs *regs,
>  	long err;
>  	unsigned int save_r2 = 0;
>  	unsigned long msr;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
> +	unsigned long amr;
> +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
>  #ifdef CONFIG_VSX
>  	int i;
>  #endif
> @@ -750,6 +758,12 @@ static long restore_user_regs(struct pt_regs *regs,
>  		return 1;
>  #endif /* CONFIG_SPE */
> 
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
> +	err |= __get_user(amr, &sr->mc_gregs[PT_AMR]);
> +	if (!err && amr != get_paca()->paca_amr)
> +		write_amr(amr);
> +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
> +
>  	return 0;
>  }
> 
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c
> index c83c115..35df2e4 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c
> @@ -174,6 +174,10 @@ static long setup_sigcontext(struct sigcontext __user *sc,
>  	if (set != NULL)
>  		err |=  __put_user(set->sig[0], &sc->oldmask);
> 
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
> +	err |= __put_user(get_paca()->paca_amr, &sc->gp_regs[PT_AMR]);
> +#endif /*  CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
> +
>  	return err;
>  }
> 
> @@ -327,6 +331,9 @@ static long restore_sigcontext(struct task_struct *tsk, sigset_t *set, int sig,
>  	unsigned long save_r13 = 0;
>  	unsigned long msr;
>  	struct pt_regs *regs = tsk->thread.regs;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
> +	unsigned long amr;
> +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
>  #ifdef CONFIG_VSX
>  	int i;
>  #endif
> @@ -406,6 +413,13 @@ static long restore_sigcontext(struct task_struct *tsk, sigset_t *set, int sig,
>  			tsk->thread.fp_state.fpr[i][TS_VSRLOWOFFSET] = 0;
>  	}
>  #endif
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
> +	err |= __get_user(amr, &sc->gp_regs[PT_AMR]);
> +	if (!err && amr != get_paca()->paca_amr)
> +		write_amr(amr);
> +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
> +
>  	return err;
>  }
> 
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c
> index d4e545d..cc4bde8b 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c
> @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
>  #include <linux/sched/debug.h>
>  #include <linux/kernel.h>
>  #include <linux/mm.h>
> +#include <linux/pkeys.h>
>  #include <linux/stddef.h>
>  #include <linux/unistd.h>
>  #include <linux/ptrace.h>
> @@ -247,6 +248,49 @@ void user_single_step_siginfo(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  	info->si_addr = (void __user *)regs->nip;
>  }
> 
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
> +static void fill_sig_info_pkey(int si_code, siginfo_t *info, unsigned long addr)
> +{
> +	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> +
> +	/* Fault not from Protection Keys: nothing to do */
> +	if (si_code != SEGV_PKUERR)
> +		return;

Should have checked this in the caller ?

> +
> +	down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
> +	/*
> +	 * we could be racing with pkey_mprotect().
> +	 * If pkey_mprotect() wins the key value could
> +	 * get modified...xxx
> +	 */
> +	vma = find_vma(current->mm, addr);
> +	up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * force_sig_info_fault() is called from a number of
> +	 * contexts, some of which have a VMA and some of which
> +	 * do not.  The Pkey-fault handing happens after we have a
> +	 * valid VMA, so we should never reach this without a
> +	 * valid VMA.
> +	 */

Also because pkey can only be used from user space when we will
definitely have a VMA associated with it.

> +	if (!vma) {
> +		WARN_ONCE(1, "Pkey fault with no VMA passed in");
> +		info->si_pkey = 0;
> +		return;
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * We could report the incorrect key because of the reason
> +	 * explained above.

What if we hold mm->mmap_sem for some more time till we update
info->si_pkey ? Is there still a chance that pkey would have
changed by the time siginfo returns to user space ? I am still
wondering is there way to hold up VMA changes to be on safer
side. Is the race conditions exists on x86 as well ?

> +	 *
> +	 * si_pkey should be thought off as a strong hint, but not
> +	 * an absolutely guarantee because of the race explained
> +	 * above.
> +	 */
> +	info->si_pkey = vma_pkey(vma);
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
> +
>  void _exception(int signr, struct pt_regs *regs, int code, unsigned long addr)
>  {
>  	siginfo_t info;
> @@ -274,6 +318,11 @@ void _exception(int signr, struct pt_regs *regs, int code, unsigned long addr)
>  	info.si_signo = signr;
>  	info.si_code = code;
>  	info.si_addr = (void __user *) addr;
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
> +	fill_sig_info_pkey(code, &info, addr);
> +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
> +
>  	force_sig_info(signr, &info, current);
>  }
> 
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c
> index c31624f..dd448d2 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c
> @@ -453,6 +453,10 @@ int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
>  	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE,
>  					flags & FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION,
>  					0)) {
> +
> +		/* our caller may not have saved the amr. Lets save it */
> +		get_paca()->paca_amr = read_amr();
> +

Something is not right here. PACA save should have happened before we
come here. Why say the caller might not have saved the AMR ? Is there
a path when its possible ?

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