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Message-ID: <20170620073845.nteivabsgcdy7gv4@pd.tnic>
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2017 09:38:45 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
kexec@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@....com>,
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Larry Woodman <lwoodman@...hat.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot
processing
On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 01:51:15PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Add support to the early boot code to use Secure Memory Encryption (SME).
> Since the kernel has been loaded into memory in a decrypted state, encrypt
> the kernel in place and update the early pagetables with the memory
> encryption mask so that new pagetable entries will use memory encryption.
>
> The routines to set the encryption mask and perform the encryption are
> stub routines for now with functionality to be added in a later patch.
>
> Because of the need to have the routines available to head_64.S, the
> mem_encrypt.c is always built and #ifdefs in mem_encrypt.c will provide
> functionality or stub routines depending on CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 8 +++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
> arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 4 +---
> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
...
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index b99d469..9a78277 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
> */
>
> #include <linux/linkage.h>
> +#include <linux/init.h>
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>
> /*
> * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
> @@ -19,3 +22,24 @@
> */
> unsigned long sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0;
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
> +
> +void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
> +{
> +}
Just the minor:
void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) { }
in case you have to respin.
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
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