linux-kernel - Re: [RFC v2 00/12] powerpc: Memory Protection Keys

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Message-ID: <1497952580.31581.51.camel@kernel.crashing.org>
Date:   Tue, 20 Jun 2017 19:56:20 +1000
From:   Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>
To:     Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        Ram Pai <linuxram@...ibm.com>, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     paulus@...ba.org, mpe@...erman.id.au, khandual@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
        aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, dave.hansen@...el.com,
        hbabu@...ibm.com
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/12] powerpc: Memory Protection Keys

On Tue, 2017-06-20 at 15:10 +1000, Balbir Singh wrote:
> On Fri, 2017-06-16 at 20:52 -0700, Ram Pai wrote:
> > Memory protection keys enable applications to protect its
> > address space from inadvertent access or corruption from
> > itself.
> 
> I presume by itself you mean protection between threads?

Not necessarily. You could have for example a JIT that
when it runs the JITed code, only "opens" the keys for
the VM itself, preventing the JITed code from "leaking out"

There are plenty of other usages...
> 
> > The overall idea:
> > 
> >  A process allocates a   key  and associates it with
> >  a  address  range  within    its   address   space.
> 
> OK, so this is per VMA?
> 
> >  The process  than  can  dynamically  set read/write 
> >  permissions on  the   key   without  involving  the 
> >  kernel.
> 
> This bit is not clear, how can the key be set without
> involving the kernel? I presume you mean the key is set
> in the PTE's and the access protection values can be
> set without involving the kernel?
> 
>  Any  code that  violates   the  permissions
> >  off the address space; as defined by its associated
> >  key, will receive a segmentation fault.
> > 
> > This patch series enables the feature on PPC64.
> > It is enabled on HPTE 64K-page platform.
> > 
> > ISA3.0 section 5.7.13 describes the detailed specifications.
> > 
> > 
> > Testing:
> > 	This patch series has passed all the protection key
> > 	tests available in  the selftests directory.
> > 	The tests are updated to work on both x86 and powerpc.
> 
> Balbir