Message-ID: <20170627073132.GC28078@dhcp22.suse.cz>
Date:   Tue, 27 Jun 2017 09:31:32 +0200
From:   Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
        "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" 
        <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        David Windsor <dave@...lcore.net>,
        Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 22/23] usercopy: split user-controlled slabs to separate
 caches

On Tue 20-06-17 15:22:58, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 1:24 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com> wrote:
> > On 06/19/2017 04:36 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> From: David Windsor <dave@...lcore.net>
> >>
> >> Some userspace APIs (e.g. ipc, seq_file) provide precise control over
> >> the size of kernel kmallocs, which provides a trivial way to perform
> >> heap overflow attacks where the attacker must control neighboring
> >> allocations of a specific size. Instead, move these APIs into their own
> >> cache so they cannot interfere with standard kmallocs. This is enabled
> >> with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC.
> >>
> >> This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY_SLABS
> >> code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
> >> of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
> >> don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@...lcore.net>
> >> [kees: added SLAB_NO_MERGE flag to allow split of future no-merge Kconfig]
> >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> >
> > I just did a quick test of kspp/usercopy-whitelist/lateston my arm64 machine and got some spew:
> >
> > [   21.818719] Unexpected gfp: 0x4000000 (0x4000000). Fixing up to gfp: 0x14000c0 (GFP_KERNEL). Fix your code!
> > [   21.828427] CPU: 7 PID: 652 Comm: irqbalance Tainted: G        W       4.12.0-rc5-whitelist+ #236
> > [   21.837259] Hardware name: AppliedMicro X-Gene Mustang Board/X-Gene Mustang Board, BIOS 3.06.12 Aug 12 2016
> > [   21.846955] Call trace:
> > [   21.849396] [<ffff000008089b18>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x210
> > [   21.854770] [<ffff000008089d4c>] show_stack+0x24/0x30
> > [   21.859798] [<ffff00000845b7bc>] dump_stack+0x90/0xb4
> > [   21.864827] [<ffff00000826ff40>] new_slab+0x88/0x90
> > [   21.869681] [<ffff000008272218>] ___slab_alloc+0x428/0x6b0
> > [   21.875141] [<ffff0000082724f0>] __slab_alloc+0x50/0x68
> > [   21.880341] [<ffff000008273208>] __kmalloc_node+0xd0/0x348
> > [   21.885800] [<ffff000008223af0>] kvmalloc_node+0xa0/0xb8
> > [   21.891088] [<ffff0000082bb400>] single_open_size+0x40/0xb0
> > [   21.896636] [<ffff000008315a9c>] stat_open+0x54/0x60
> > [   21.901576] [<ffff00000830adf8>] proc_reg_open+0x90/0x168
> > [   21.906950] [<ffff00000828def4>] do_dentry_open+0x1c4/0x328
> > [   21.912496] [<ffff00000828f470>] vfs_open+0x58/0x88
> > [   21.917351] [<ffff0000082a1f14>] do_last+0x3d4/0x770
> > [   21.922292] [<ffff0000082a233c>] path_openat+0x8c/0x2e8
> > [   21.927492] [<ffff0000082a3888>] do_filp_open+0x70/0xe8
> > [   21.932692] [<ffff00000828f940>] do_sys_open+0x178/0x208
> > [   21.937977] [<ffff00000828fa54>] SyS_openat+0x3c/0x50
> > [   21.943005] [<ffff0000080835f0>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
> >
> >
> > I don't think 7e7844226f10 ("lockdep: allow to disable reclaim lockup detection")
> > is correct after new flags are added because we will still need space
> > for another bit even if lockdep is disabled. That might need to
> > be fixed separately.
> 
> Err... that commit has "___GFP_NOLOCKDEP       0x4000000u", but my
> tree shows it as 0x2000000u? Hmm, looks like 1bde33e05123
> ("include/linux/gfp.h: fix ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP value") fixed that?

yes

> Oh, or
> I have misread it. It looks like new GFP flags need to be added
> _above_ GFP_NOLOCKDEP and have to bump GFP_NOLOCKDEP's value too? Like
> this:
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/gfp.h b/include/linux/gfp.h
> index ff4f4a698ad0..deb8ac39fba5 100644
> --- a/include/linux/gfp.h
> +++ b/include/linux/gfp.h
> @@ -40,12 +40,12 @@ struct vm_area_struct;
>  #define ___GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM  0x400000u
>  #define ___GFP_WRITE           0x800000u
>  #define ___GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM  0x1000000u
> +#define ___GFP_USERCOPY                0x2000000u
>  #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
> -#define ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP       0x2000000u
> +#define ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP       0x4000000u
>  #else
>  #define ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP       0
>  #endif
> -#define ___GFP_USERCOPY                0x4000000u
>  /* If the above are modified, __GFP_BITS_SHIFT may need updating */

yes, this would work for your case. But...

> > I'm really not a fan the GFP approach though since the flags tend
> > to be a little bit fragile to manage. If we're going to have to
> > add something to callsites anyway, maybe we could just have an
> > alternate function (kmalloc_user?) instead of a GFP flag.

I agree. One additional concern I would have is that people tend to
propagate gfp maks down different layers. What would happen if such a
flag gets to a caller which doesn't expect it. Couldn't it reduce the
whole security point of this excercise?

But I am not really sure I understand consequences of this patch. So how
do those attacks look like. Do you have an example of a CVE which would
be prevented by this measure?

> This would mean building out *_user() versions for all the various
> *alloc() functions, though. That gets kind of long/ugly.

Only prepare those which are really needed. It seems only handful of
them in your patch.

> The other reason to use a GFP flag is to be able to interrogate a
> cache later, which will be handy for doing things like %p and kernel
> symbol censorship (this is what grsecurity does with their HIDESYM
> logic). "If this would write to a usercopy-whitelisted object, censor
> it" etc. Though now that I go double-check, it looks like grsecurity
> uses cache->usersize as an indicator of censorship-need on slab
> caches, not the GFP flag, which is only used to use the split kmalloc
> cache.

which sounds like a separate kmalloc API would do the trick without a new
gfp mask.

> (Though as far as flags go, there is also VM_USERCOPY for what
> are now the kvmalloc*() cases.)

OK, I was about to ask about vmalloc fallbacks. So this is not
implemented in your patch. Does it metter from the security point of
view?

> Perhaps this should be named GFP_USERSIZED or so?
-- 
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs

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