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Message-ID: <20170627175118.GA14286@infradead.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2017 10:51:18 -0700
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
To: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>
Cc: keescook@...omium.org, mhocko@...nel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp, paul@...l-moore.com,
sds@...ho.nsa.gov, casey@...aufler-ca.com, hch@...radead.org,
labbott@...hat.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option
On Tue, Jun 27, 2017 at 08:33:23PM +0300, Igor Stoppa wrote:
> From: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...il.com>
>
> This patch shows how it is possible to take advantage of pmalloc:
> instead of using the build-time option __lsm_ro_after_init, to decide if
> it is possible to keep the hooks modifiable, now this becomes a
> boot-time decision, based on the kernel command line.
>
> This patch relies on:
>
> "Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head"
> Author: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
>
> to break free from the static constraint imposed by the previous
> hardening model, based on __ro_after_init.
>
> The default value is disabled, unless SE Linux debugging is turned on.
Can we please just force it to be read-only?
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