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Message-ID: <jpgwp7t75os.fsf@linux.bootlegged.copy>
Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2017 13:20:51 -0400
From: Bandan Das <bsd@...hat.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: nVMX: Implement EPTP switching for the L1 hypervisor
Hi Paolo,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com> writes:
> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: "Bandan Das" <bsd@...hat.com>
>> To: kvm@...r.kernel.org
>> Cc: pbonzini@...hat.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
>> Sent: Friday, June 30, 2017 1:29:55 AM
>> Subject: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: nVMX: Implement EPTP switching for the L1 hypervisor
>>
>> This is a mix of emulation/passthrough to implement EPTP
>> switching for the nested hypervisor.
>>
>> If the shadow EPT are absent, a vmexit occurs with reason 59.
>> L0 can then create shadow structures based on the entry that the
>> guest calls with to obtain a new root_hpa that can be written to
>> the shadow list and subsequently, reload the mmu to resume L2.
>> On the next vmfunc(0, index) however, the processor will load the
>> entry without an exit.
>
> What happens if the root_hpa is dropped by the L0 MMU? I'm not sure
> what removes it from the shadow EPT list.
That would result in a vmfunc vmexit, which will jump to handle_vmfunc
and then a call to mmu_alloc_shadow_roots() that will overwrite the shadow
eptp entry with the new one.
I believe part of your question is also that root_hpa is valid, just not
tracking the current l1 eptp and in that case, the processor can jump to
some other guest's page tables which is a problem. In that case, I think it should
be possible to invalidate that entry in the shadow eptp list.
> For a first version of the patch, I would prefer a less optimized
> version that always goes through L0 when L2 executes VMFUNC.
> To achieve this effect, you can copy "enable VM functions" secondary
> execution control from vmcs12 to vmcs02, but leave the VM-function
> controls to 0 in vmcs02.
Is the current approach prone to other undesired corner cases like the one
you pointed above ? :) I would be uncomfortable having this in if you feel
having the cpu jump to a new eptp feels like an interesting exploitable
interface; however, I think it would be nice to have l2 execute vmfunc without
exiting to L0.
Thanks for the quick review!
> Paolo
>
>> Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <bsd@...hat.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 5 +++
>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 104
>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 2 files changed, 109 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
>> index 35cd06f..e06783e 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
>> @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
>> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING 0x00000400
>> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND 0x00000800
>> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID 0x00001000
>> +#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC 0x00002000
>> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS 0x00004000
>> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED 0x00010000
>> #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML 0x00020000
>> @@ -114,6 +115,10 @@
>> #define VMX_MISC_SAVE_EFER_LMA 0x00000020
>> #define VMX_MISC_ACTIVITY_HLT 0x00000040
>>
>> +/* VMFUNC functions */
>> +#define VMX_VMFUNC_EPTP_SWITCHING 0x00000001
>> +#define VMFUNC_EPTP_ENTRIES 512
>> +
>> static inline u32 vmx_basic_vmcs_revision_id(u64 vmx_basic)
>> {
>> return vmx_basic & GENMASK_ULL(30, 0);
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>> index ca5d2b9..75049c0 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>> @@ -240,11 +240,13 @@ struct __packed vmcs12 {
>> u64 virtual_apic_page_addr;
>> u64 apic_access_addr;
>> u64 posted_intr_desc_addr;
>> + u64 vm_function_control;
>> u64 ept_pointer;
>> u64 eoi_exit_bitmap0;
>> u64 eoi_exit_bitmap1;
>> u64 eoi_exit_bitmap2;
>> u64 eoi_exit_bitmap3;
>> + u64 eptp_list_address;
>> u64 xss_exit_bitmap;
>> u64 guest_physical_address;
>> u64 vmcs_link_pointer;
>> @@ -441,6 +443,7 @@ struct nested_vmx {
>> struct page *apic_access_page;
>> struct page *virtual_apic_page;
>> struct page *pi_desc_page;
>> + struct page *shadow_eptp_list;
>> struct pi_desc *pi_desc;
>> bool pi_pending;
>> u16 posted_intr_nv;
>> @@ -481,6 +484,7 @@ struct nested_vmx {
>> u64 nested_vmx_cr4_fixed0;
>> u64 nested_vmx_cr4_fixed1;
>> u64 nested_vmx_vmcs_enum;
>> + u64 nested_vmx_vmfunc_controls;
>> };
>>
>> #define POSTED_INTR_ON 0
>> @@ -1314,6 +1318,22 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_tsc_scaling(void)
>> SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING;
>> }
>>
>> +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc(void)
>> +{
>> + return vmcs_config.cpu_based_exec_ctrl &
>> + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline u64 vmx_vmfunc_controls(void)
>> +{
>> + u64 controls = 0;
>> +
>> + if (cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc())
>> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC, controls);
>> +
>> + return controls;
>> +}
>> +
>> static inline bool report_flexpriority(void)
>> {
>> return flexpriority_enabled;
>> @@ -1388,6 +1408,18 @@ static inline bool nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(struct
>> vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>> return vmcs12->pin_based_vm_exec_control & PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
>> }
>>
>> +static inline bool nested_cpu_has_vmfunc(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>> +{
>> + return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline bool nested_cpu_has_eptp_switching(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>> +{
>> + return nested_cpu_has_vmfunc(vmcs12) &&
>> + (vmcs12->vm_function_control &
>> + VMX_VMFUNC_EPTP_SWITCHING);
>> +}
>> +
>> static inline bool is_nmi(u32 intr_info)
>> {
>> return (intr_info & (INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK))
>> @@ -3143,6 +3175,9 @@ static int vmx_get_vmx_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32
>> msr_index, u64 *pdata)
>> *pdata = vmx->nested.nested_vmx_ept_caps |
>> ((u64)vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vpid_caps << 32);
>> break;
>> + case MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
>> + *pdata = vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vmfunc_controls;
>> + break;
>> default:
>> return 1;
>> }
>> @@ -6959,6 +6994,14 @@ static int enter_vmx_operation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs = shadow_vmcs;
>> }
>>
>> + if (vmx_vmfunc_controls() & 1) {
>> + struct page *page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
>> +
>> + if (!page)
>> + goto out_shadow_vmcs;
>> + vmx->nested.shadow_eptp_list = page;
>> + }
>> +
>> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(vmx->nested.vmcs02_pool));
>> vmx->nested.vmcs02_num = 0;
>>
>> @@ -7128,6 +7171,11 @@ static void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>> vmx->vmcs01.shadow_vmcs = NULL;
>> }
>> kfree(vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12);
>> +
>> + if (vmx->nested.shadow_eptp_list) {
>> + __free_page(vmx->nested.shadow_eptp_list);
>> + vmx->nested.shadow_eptp_list = NULL;
>> + }
>> /* Unpin physical memory we referred to in current vmcs02 */
>> if (vmx->nested.apic_access_page) {
>> nested_release_page(vmx->nested.apic_access_page);
>> @@ -7740,6 +7788,61 @@ static int handle_preemption_timer(struct kvm_vcpu
>> *vcpu)
>> return 1;
>> }
>>
>> +static int handle_vmfunc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> +{
>> + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
>> + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12;
>> + struct page *page = NULL,
>> + *shadow_page = vmx->nested.shadow_eptp_list;
>> + u64 *l1_eptp_list, *shadow_eptp_list;
>> + u32 index = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
>> + u32 function = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
>> +
>> + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
>> + vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
>> + if (!nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12) ||
>> + !nested_cpu_has_eptp_switching(vmcs12))
>> + goto fail;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Only function 0 is valid, everything upto 63 injects VMFUNC
>> + * exit reason to L1, and #UD thereafter
>> + */
>> + if (function || !vmcs12->eptp_list_address ||
>> + index >= VMFUNC_EPTP_ENTRIES)
>> + goto fail;
>> +
>> + page = nested_get_page(vcpu, vmcs12->eptp_list_address);
>> + if (!page)
>> + goto fail;
>> +
>> + l1_eptp_list = kmap(page);
>> + if (!l1_eptp_list[index])
>> + goto fail;
>> +
>> + kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
>> + /*
>> + * TODO: Verify that guest ept satisfies vmentry prereqs
>> + */
>> + vmcs12->ept_pointer = l1_eptp_list[index];
>> + shadow_eptp_list = phys_to_virt(page_to_phys(shadow_page));
>> + kvm_mmu_reload(vcpu);
>> + shadow_eptp_list[index] =
>> + construct_eptp(vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa);
>> + kunmap(page);
>> +
>> + return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
>> + }
>> +
>> +fail:
>> + if (page)
>> + kunmap(page);
>> + nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, vmx->exit_reason,
>> + vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO),
>> + vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION));
>> + return 1;
>> +}
>> +
>> /*
>> * The exit handlers return 1 if the exit was handled fully and guest
>> execution
>> * may resume. Otherwise they set the kvm_run parameter to indicate what
>> needs
>> @@ -7790,6 +7893,7 @@ static int (*const kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[])(struct
>> kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
>> [EXIT_REASON_XSAVES] = handle_xsaves,
>> [EXIT_REASON_XRSTORS] = handle_xrstors,
>> [EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL] = handle_pml_full,
>> + [EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC] = handle_vmfunc,
>> [EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER] = handle_preemption_timer,
>> };
>>
>> --
>> 2.9.4
>>
>>
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