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Message-Id: <20170703133403.537358542@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Jul 2017 15:34:49 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Mateusz Jurczyk <mjurczyk@...gle.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.11 09/84] af_unix: Add sockaddr length checks before accessing sa_family in bind and connect handlers
4.11-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mateusz Jurczyk <mjurczyk@...gle.com>
[ Upstream commit defbcf2decc903a28d8398aa477b6881e711e3ea ]
Verify that the caller-provided sockaddr structure is large enough to
contain the sa_family field, before accessing it in bind() and connect()
handlers of the AF_UNIX socket. Since neither syscall enforces a minimum
size of the corresponding memory region, very short sockaddrs (zero or
one byte long) result in operating on uninitialized memory while
referencing .sa_family.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Jurczyk <mjurczyk@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -999,7 +999,8 @@ static int unix_bind(struct socket *sock
struct path path = { NULL, NULL };
err = -EINVAL;
- if (sunaddr->sun_family != AF_UNIX)
+ if (addr_len < offsetofend(struct sockaddr_un, sun_family) ||
+ sunaddr->sun_family != AF_UNIX)
goto out;
if (addr_len == sizeof(short)) {
@@ -1110,6 +1111,10 @@ static int unix_dgram_connect(struct soc
unsigned int hash;
int err;
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ if (alen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+ goto out;
+
if (addr->sa_family != AF_UNSPEC) {
err = unix_mkname(sunaddr, alen, &hash);
if (err < 0)
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