Date:   Fri, 07 Jul 2017 13:49:37 -0400
From:   Jeff Layton <jlayton@...hat.com>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] integrity: track mtime in addition to i_version for
 assessment

On Fri, 2017-07-07 at 13:24 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Fri, 2017-07-07 at 12:57 -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
> > On Fri, 2017-07-07 at 10:05 -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
> > > From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@...hat.com>
> > > 
> > > The IMA assessment code tries to use the i_version counter to detect
> > > when changes to a file have occurred. Many filesystems don't increment
> > > it properly (or at all) so detecting changes with that is not always
> > > reliable.
> > > 
> > > That check should be gated on IS_I_VERSION, as you can't rely on the
> > > i_version field changing unless that returns true.
> > > 
> > > Have the code also track and check the mtime for the file. If the
> > > IS_I_VERSION returns false, then use it to detect whether the file's
> > > contents might have changed.
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@...hat.com>
> > > ---
> > >  security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c  |  4 +++-
> > >  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> > >  security/integrity/integrity.h    |  1 +
> > >  3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> > > 
> > > v2: switch to storing/checking mtime instead of ctime
> > > 
> > 
> > To be clear here, I don't have a large interest in IMA, but I am looking
> > at making changes to how the i_version counter is handled. IMA's use of
> > it is problematic for some of those changes (and somewhat sketchy).
> > 
> > I think you either want something like the patch below, or you need to
> > somehow ensure that you're not doing any of this on a superblock that
> > doesn't have MS_I_VERSION set on it.
> > 
> > I'm not that familiar with IMA in general though, so it's possible I'm
> > missing something. Is that already being done somehow?
> 
> Before reverting to using mtime, which wasn't fine grained enough at
> the time, it would be helpful to first understand the type of changes
> and the reasons for the changes you're looking to make to i_version.

Sure, I posted a patchset back in December, actually:

    [RFC PATCH v1 00/30] fs: inode->i_version rework and optimization

The basic idea is to improve performance on filesystems that implement
the i_version counter by allowing them to optimize away metadata updates
that are due solely to i_version counter change when no one is actually
using it. This will also pave the way to allow us to more reasonably
provide an i_version counter on network filesystems and the like that
might have weaker consistency guarantees than a local fs.

Your point about mtime not being granular enough is valid however. It's
certainly possible for extra writes to race in during the jiffy or so
window that represents the mtime resolution. It's just that that is
still more granular than you'll get on a filesystem that never actually
increments the i_version counter on a write.

>  After all, i_version has been working all this time (~2009).
> 

The i_version counter works just fine on filesystems that implement it
properly. That's a very short list: xfs, btrfs, and ext4 for local
filesystems. NFS and AFS would also likely be fine here, though they
don't set MS_I_VERSION.

The rest though do not support it consistently and IMA should not be
relying on it on them. This is why the kernel nfs server only relies on
the i_version field when IS_I_VERSION returns true.

I'll ask again -- is IMA somehow limited only being used only on that
subset of filesystems? My guess from a glance at the integrity_read
patchset is that it is not.

> > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> > > index c2edba8de35e..b8d746bbc43d 100644
> > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> > > @@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> > >  	} hash;
> > >  
> > >  	if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
> > > -		u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
> > > +		u64 i_version = inode->i_version;
> > > +		struct timespec i_mtime = inode->i_mtime;
> > >  
> > >  		if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) {
> > >  			audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
> > > @@ -225,6 +226,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> > >  				iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
> > >  				memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
> > >  				iint->version = i_version;
> > > +				iint->mtime = i_mtime;
> > >  				iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
> > >  			} else
> > >  				result = -ENOMEM;
> > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > > index 2aebb7984437..8d12ef2d3ba2 100644
> > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > > @@ -113,6 +113,25 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
> > >  				  "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
> > >  }
> > >  
> > > +static bool ima_should_update_iint(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> > > +				struct inode *inode)
> > > +{
> > > +	if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) != 1)
> > > +		return false;
> > > +	if (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)
> > > +		return true;
> > > +	if (IS_I_VERSION(inode)) {
> > > +		if (iint->version != inode->i_version)
> > > +			return true;
> > > +	} else {
> > > +		if (iint->mtime.tv_sec != inode->i_mtime.tv_sec)
> > > +			return true;
> > > +		if (iint->mtime.tv_nsec != inode->i_mtime.tv_nsec)
> > > +			return true;
> > > +	}
> > > +	return false;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > >  static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> > >  				  struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> > >  {
> > > @@ -122,14 +141,11 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> > >  		return;
> > >  
> > >  	inode_lock(inode);
> > > -	if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) {
> > > -		if ((iint->version != inode->i_version) ||
> > > -		    (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) {
> > > -			iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
> > > -			iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
> > > -			if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
> > > -				ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
> > > -		}
> > > +	if (ima_should_update_iint(iint, inode)) {
> > > +		iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
> > > +		iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
> > > +		if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
> > > +			ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
> > >  	}
> > >  	inode_unlock(inode);
> > >  }
> > > diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> > > index a53e7e4ab06c..61fffa7583bf 100644
> > > --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
> > > +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> > > @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
> > >  	struct rb_node rb_node;	/* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
> > >  	struct inode *inode;	/* back pointer to inode in question */
> > >  	u64 version;		/* track inode changes */
> > > +	struct timespec mtime;	/* track inode changes */
> > >  	unsigned long flags;
> > >  	unsigned long measured_pcrs;
> > >  	enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
> 
> 

-- 
Jeff Layton <jlayton@...hat.com>

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