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Message-ID: <20170708092426.prf7xmmnv6xvdqx4@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2017 11:24:26 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
kexec@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@....com>,
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Larry Woodman <lwoodman@...hat.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
* Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com> wrote:
> This patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
> feature.
I'm wondering, what's the typical performance hit to DRAM access latency when SME
is enabled?
On that same note, if the performance hit is noticeable I'd expect SME to not be
enabled in native kernels typically - but still it looks like a useful hardware
feature. Since it's controlled at the page table level, have you considered
allowing SME-activated vmas via mmap(), even on kernels that are otherwise not
using encrypted DRAM?
One would think that putting encryption keys into such encrypted RAM regions would
generally improve robustness against various physical space attacks that want to
extract keys but don't have full control of the CPU.
Thanks,
Ingo
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