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Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2017 05:09:53 -0700 From: tip-bot for Thomas Garnier <tipbot@...or.com> To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org Cc: dave.hansen@...el.com, dhowells@...hat.com, linux@...linux.org.uk, hpa@...or.com, pmladek@...e.com, catalin.marinas@....com, tglx@...utronix.de, oleg@...hat.com, pbonzini@...hat.com, mingo@...nel.org, cmetcalf@...lanox.com, riel@...hat.com, will.deacon@....com, mbenes@...e.cz, jpoimboe@...hat.com, thgarnie@...gle.com, luto@...capital.net, luto@...nel.org, wad@...omium.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mark.rutland@....com, arnd@...db.de, keescook@...omium.org, panand@...hat.com, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk Subject: [tip:x86/syscall] x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return Commit-ID: 5ea0727b163cb5575e36397a12eade68a1f35f24 Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/5ea0727b163cb5575e36397a12eade68a1f35f24 Author: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> AuthorDate: Wed, 14 Jun 2017 18:12:01 -0700 Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de> CommitDate: Sat, 8 Jul 2017 14:05:32 +0200 x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and elevate privileges [1]. The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if needed. The addr_limit_user_check function is added as a cross-architecture function to check the address limit. [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com> Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@...e.cz> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@...lanox.com> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@...hat.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org Cc: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org> Cc: linux-api@...r.kernel.org Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170615011203.144108-1-thgarnie@google.com --- arch/x86/entry/common.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 5 ++++- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 7 ++++++- include/linux/syscalls.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c index cdefcfd..03505ff 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h> #include <linux/uprobes.h> #include <linux/livepatch.h> +#include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <asm/desc.h> #include <asm/traps.h> @@ -183,6 +184,8 @@ __visible inline void prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs) struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info(); u32 cached_flags; + addr_limit_user_check(); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) && WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled())) local_irq_disable(); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h index e00e1bd..5161da1a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ struct thread_info { #define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT 28 /* syscall tracepoint instrumentation */ #define TIF_ADDR32 29 /* 32-bit address space on 64 bits */ #define TIF_X32 30 /* 32-bit native x86-64 binary */ +#define TIF_FSCHECK 31 /* Check FS is USER_DS on return */ #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) #define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME (1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) @@ -122,6 +123,7 @@ struct thread_info { #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT) #define _TIF_ADDR32 (1 << TIF_ADDR32) #define _TIF_X32 (1 << TIF_X32) +#define _TIF_FSCHECK (1 << TIF_FSCHECK) /* * work to do in syscall_trace_enter(). Also includes TIF_NOHZ for @@ -137,7 +139,8 @@ struct thread_info { (_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_SIGPENDING | \ _TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_SINGLESTEP | _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU | \ _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY | _TIF_UPROBE | \ - _TIF_PATCH_PENDING | _TIF_NOHZ | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT) + _TIF_PATCH_PENDING | _TIF_NOHZ | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | \ + _TIF_FSCHECK) /* flags to check in __switch_to() */ #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW \ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index a059aac..11433f9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -26,7 +26,12 @@ #define get_ds() (KERNEL_DS) #define get_fs() (current->thread.addr_limit) -#define set_fs(x) (current->thread.addr_limit = (x)) +static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs) +{ + current->thread.addr_limit = fs; + /* On user-mode return, check fs is correct */ + set_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK); +} #define segment_eq(a, b) ((a).seg == (b).seg) diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h index 980c3c9..ac0cf6f 100644 --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h @@ -206,6 +206,22 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs; } \ static inline long SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__)) +#ifdef TIF_FSCHECK +/* + * Called before coming back to user-mode. Returning to user-mode with an + * address limit different than USER_DS can allow to overwrite kernel memory. + */ +static inline void addr_limit_user_check(void) +{ + + if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK)) + return; + + BUG_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)); + clear_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK); +} +#endif + asmlinkage long sys32_quotactl(unsigned int cmd, const char __user *special, qid_t id, void __user *addr); asmlinkage long sys_time(time_t __user *tloc);
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