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Message-Id: <1499673451-66160-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2017 00:57:26 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>,
Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Greg Ungerer <gerg@...ux-m68k.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@...aro.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/8] exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability
The examination of "current" to decide dumpability is wrong. This was a
check of and euid/uid (or egid/gid) mismatch in the existing process,
not the newly created one. This appears to stretch back into even the
"history.git" tree. Luckily, dumpability is later set in commit_creds().
In earlier kernel versions before creds existed, similar checks also
existed late in the exec flow, covering up the mistake as far back as I
could find.
The commit_creds() check examines differences of euid, uid, egid, gid,
and capabilities between the old and new creds. It would look like
the setup_new_exec() dumpability test could be entirely removed, but
strictly speaking, the secureexec test covers a different set of tests
than what commit_creds() checks for. So, fix this test to use secureexec,
which includes the same logical check (euid != uid || egid != gid),
but checks bprm->cred, not current->cred.
One would wonder if we need a security_commit_creds() LSM hook and to
move the existing checks in commit_creds() into commoncaps.c, which
would allow expanding the logic to all LSMs. Currently this doesn't
seem needed, though.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
fs/exec.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index b92e37fb53aa..3e519d4f0bd3 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1346,7 +1346,7 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
- if (uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) && gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid()))
+ if (!bprm->secureexec)
set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
else
set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
--
2.7.4
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