linux-kernel - Re: [RFC][PATCH] exec: Use init rlimits for setuid exec

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20170710162751.GC7071@dhcp22.suse.cz>
Date:   Mon, 10 Jul 2017 18:27:52 +0200
From:   Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
        Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
        Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
        Larry Woodman <lwoodman@...hat.com>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@...isc-linux.org>,
        Helge Diller <deller@....de>,
        James Hogan <james.hogan@...tec.com>,
        Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>,
        "security@...nel.org" <security@...nel.org>,
        Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@...lys.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Ximin Luo <infinity0@...ian.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] exec: Use init rlimits for setuid exec

On Mon 10-07-17 09:12:11, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 1:44 AM, Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org> wrote:
> > On Thu 06-07-17 12:12:55, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 10:52 AM, Linus Torvalds
> >> <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> >> > On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 10:29 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> >> >>>
> >> >>>  (a) minimal: just use our existing default stack (and stack _only_)
> >> >>> limit value for suid binaries that actually get extra permissions: {
> >> >>> _STK_LIM, RLIM_INFINITY }.
> >> >>
> >> >> This would look a lot like the existing patch; it'd just not copy the
> >> >> init process rlimits.
> >> >
> >> > Can't we just do the final rlimit setting so late in execve that we
> >> > don't need that whole "saved_rlimit" thing?
> >>
> >> The stack rlimit defines the mmap layout too:
> >>
> >> do_execveat_common() ->
> >> exec_binprm() ->
> >> search_binary_handler() ->
> >> fmt->load_binary (load_elf_binary()) ->
> >> setup_new_exec() ->
> >> arch_pick_mmap_layout() ->
> >> mmap_is_legacy() ->
> >> rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK) == RLIM_INFINITY
> >
> > FWIW this is gone in tip tree. See
> > lkml.kernel.org/r/20170614082218.12450-1-mhocko@...nel.org
> 
> Sounds good to me, but won't large-memory users in 32-bit get annoyed?

Why would they? 32b do bottom up layouts by default.
-- 
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs