linux-kernel - Re: [GIT PULL] Please pull NFS client changes for Linux 4.13

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Message-ID: <1500064716.3755.1.camel@gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:38:36 -0400
From:   Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>
To:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     Dave Jones <davej@...emonkey.org.uk>,
        Anna Schumaker <schumaker.anna@...il.com>,
        Linux NFS Mailing List <linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Please pull NFS client changes for Linux 4.13

On Fri, 2017-07-14 at 12:58 -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 12:43 PM, Andrey Ryabinin
> <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > yet when I look at the generated code for __ip_map_lookup, I see
> > > 
> > >        movl    $32, %edx       #,
> > >        movq    %r13, %rsi      # class,
> > >        leaq    48(%rax), %rdi  #, tmp126
> > >        call    strscpy #
> > > 
> > > what's the bug here? Look at that third argume8nt - %rdx. It is
> > > initialized to 32.
> > 
> > It's not a compiler bug, it's a bug in our strcpy().
> > Whoever wrote this strcpy() into strscpy() code apparently didn't
> > read carefully
> > enough gcc manual about __builtin_object_size().
> > 
> > Summary from https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Object-Size-Checking
> > .html :
> > 
> >         __builtin_object_size(ptr, type) returns a constant number
> > of bytes from 'ptr' to the end of the object 'ptr'
> >         pointer points to. "type" is an integer constant from 0 to
> > 3. If the least significant bit is clear, objects
> >         are whole variables, if it is set, a closest surrounding
> > subobject is considered the object a pointer points to.
> >         The second bit determines if maximum or minimum of remaining
> > bytes is computed.
> > 
> > We have type = 0 in strcpy(), so the least significant bit is clear.
> > So the 'ptr' is considered as a pointer to the whole
> > variable i.e. pointer to struct ip_map ip;
> > And the number of bytes from 'ip.m_class' to the end of the ip
> > object is exactly 32.
> > 
> > I suppose that changing the type to 1 should fix this bug.
> 
> Oh, that absolutely needs to be done.
> 
> Because that "strcpy() -> strscpy()" conversion really depends on that
> size being the right size (well, in this case minimal safe size) for
> the actual accesses, exactly because "strscpy()" is perfectly willing
> to write *past* the end of the destination string within that given
> size limit (ie it reads and writes in the same 8-byte chunks).
> 
> So if you have a small target string that is contained in a big
> object, then the "hardened" strcpy() code can actually end up
> overwriting things past the end of the strring, even if the string
> itself were to have fit in the buffer.
> 
> I note that every single use in string.h is buggy, and it worries me
> that __compiletime_object_size() does this too. The only user of that
> seems to be check_copy_size(), and now I'm a bit worried what that bug
> may have hidden.
> 
> I find "hardening" code that adds bugs to be particularly bad and
> ugly, the same way that I absolutely *hate* debugging code that turns
> out to make debugging impossible (we had that with the "better" stack
> tracing code that caused kernel panics to kill the machine entirely
> rather than show the backtrace, and I'm still bitter about it a decade
> after the fact).
> 
> There is something actively *evil* about it. Daniel, Kees, please jump
> on this.
> 
> Andrey, thanks for noticing this thing,
> 
>                           Linus

The issue is the usage of strscpy then, not the __builtin_object_size
type parameter. The type is set 0 rather than 1 to be more lenient by
not detecting intra-object overflow, which is going to come later.

If strscpy treats the count parameter as a *guarantee* of the dest size
rather than a limit, it's wrong to use it there, whether or not the type
parameter for __builtin_object_size is 0 or 1 since it can still return
a larger size. It's a limit with no guaranteed minimum.

My initial patch used strlcpy there, because I wasn't aware of strscpy
before it was suggested:

http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/04/11

I was wrong to move it to strscpy. It could be switched back to strlcpy
again unless the kernel considers the count parameter to be a guarantee
that could be leveraged in the future. Using the fortified strlen +
memcpy would provide the improvement that strscpy was meant to provide
there over strlcpy.