linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.16 161/178] mac80211: reject ToDS broadcast data frames

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Sun, 16 Jul 2017 14:56:46 +0100
From:   Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC:     akpm@...ux-foundation.org, "Jouni Malinen" <j@...fi>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        "Johannes Berg" <johannes.berg@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 161/178] mac80211: reject ToDS broadcast data frames

3.16.46-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@...el.com>

commit 3018e947d7fd536d57e2b550c33e456d921fff8c upstream.

AP/AP_VLAN modes don't accept any real 802.11 multicast data
frames, but since they do need to accept broadcast management
frames the same is currently permitted for data frames. This
opens a security problem because such frames would be decrypted
with the GTK, and could even contain unicast L3 frames.

Since the spec says that ToDS frames must always have the BSSID
as the RA (addr1), reject any other data frames.

The problem was originally reported in "Predicting, Decrypting,
and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys" at usenix
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/vanhoef
and brought to my attention by Jouni.

Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@...fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@...el.com>
--
Dave, I didn't want to send you a new pull request for a single
commit yet again - can you apply this one patch as is?
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: Put the new code in an else-block since the
 previous if-blocks may or may not return]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
 net/mac80211/rx.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -3140,6 +3140,30 @@ static bool prepare_for_handlers(struct
 			if (!ieee80211_is_beacon(hdr->frame_control))
 				return false;
 			status->rx_flags &= ~IEEE80211_RX_RA_MATCH;
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * 802.11-2016 Table 9-26 says that for data frames,
+			 * A1 must be the BSSID - we've checked that already
+			 * but may have accepted the wildcard
+			 * (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff).
+			 *
+			 * It also says:
+			 *	The BSSID of the Data frame is determined as
+			 *      follows:
+			 *	a) If the STA is contained within an AP or is
+			 *         associated with an AP, the BSSID is the
+			 *         address currently in use by the STA
+			 *         contained in the AP.
+			 *
+			 * So we should not accept data frames with an address
+			 * that's multicast.
+			 *
+			 * Accepting it also opens a security problem because
+			 * stations could encrypt it with the GTK and inject
+			 * traffic that way.
+			 */
+			if (ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) && multicast)
+				return false;
 		}
 		break;
 	case NL80211_IFTYPE_WDS: